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ABSTRACT 
 The thesis investigates how U.S. national interests have been defined in the 
country’s immigration policy, and whether the current policy, which prioritizes 
family-based immigration, supports those interests. The Donald J. Trump administration 
has looked to Canada’s points-based system, which has brought highly skilled and 
educated immigrants into the country. Through a comparative analysis of Canada’s and 
the United States’ immigration policies, this research provides perspective on whether 
screening immigrants is an effective way to meet a country’s national interests, 
particularly economic interests, and whether other factors must be considered for 
immigration policies. Ultimately, this thesis found that current U.S. immigration policies 
do not best serve national interests. This is not because the U.S. prioritizes family-based 
immigration but rather because the stagnant immigration policy does not respond to the 
changing needs of the country. Common-sense immigration reform requires more than 
looking to foreign partners for solutions; it requires us to review current practices and 
identify ways to enhance existing policies. 
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Family reunification has long been a central goal of U.S. immigration policy.1 
While other comparable countries, such as Canada, prefer to admit individuals based on 
their skills, the United States accepts more individuals due to family ties than any other 
immigrant visa category.2 Family-based immigration does not screen potential immigrants 
for their skills or potential value to the country.3 Critics of the current family-based 
immigration system argue that a merit-based system (also known as a points-based system) 
would best meet U.S. needs, especially the country’s economic interests.4 They also argue 
that the existing immigration system fails to meet the needs of the country as it progresses 
toward a knowledge and innovation economy.5 These arguments suggest that, in a 
competitive global market, the United States should focus on bringing in individuals who 
have the skill sets that will give the country a competitive edge. Opponents of the current 
family-based system also believe it encourages the migration of low-skilled workers, seen 
as harmful to both American wages and the labor market.6  
The last time the United States examined its immigration system to support U.S. 
national interests was in 1990. Since the Immigration Act of 1990, the economy has 
continued to grow, industries have transformed, and the U.S. working population has 
changed. While there have been attempts by successive administrations to reform the U.S. 
                                                 
1 Congressional Budget Office, Immigration Policy in the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Congress, February 2006), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7051/02-28-
immigration.pdf. 
2 Zoya Gubernskaya and Joanna Dreby, “US Immigration Policy and the Case for Family Unity,” 
Journal on Migration and Human Security 5, no. 2 (2017): 418. 
3 Immigration: The Economic Impact: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 109th 
Cong. (2006) (statement of Barry Chiswick, UIC Professor). 
4 S., Immigration. 
5 Tom Cotton and David Perdue, “Reforming American Immigration for a Stronger Economy Act 
(RAISE Act): A Bill to Raise Working Wages & Boost American Competitiveness” (fact sheet, U.S. 
Senate, 2017), https://www.perdue.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
170801_New_RAISE_Act_One_Pager_FINAL.pdf. 
6 David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So Bad? NBER Working Paper No. 11547 (Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005), 1, http://www.nber.org/papers/w11547. 
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immigration system, efforts have reached a stalemate. Decisions about which types of 
immigrant’s to prioritize—family-based, or skilled-based—continue to be a challenge for 
policymakers. They are further challenged to reach a consensus about the type of 
immigration system that would best support U.S. national interests. Accordingly, this thesis 
investigates how U.S. national interests have been defined in immigration policies, and 
whether current policy supports those interests.  
This thesis reveals that the current U.S. immigration policy does not best serve 
national interests. This is not because the United States prioritizes family-based 
immigration but is rather due to stagnant immigration policy that does not respond to the 
changing needs of the country. The research shows that immigration proposals throughout 
the years have defined national interests differently, in accordance with the economic and 
political environment at the moment. Open immigration policies reflect periods of 
economic growth, while restrictive immigration policies reflect periods of mistrust or 
economic insecurities. The Donald J. Trump administration has propagated that U.S. 
national interests should be about the safeguarding of the American-born worker and the 
United States’ ability to bring in the “best and brightest” immigrants to compete in a global 
economy. President Trump has argued that family-based immigration, which he refers to 
as chain migration, is detrimental to the country’s competitiveness.7 Family-based 
immigration has been framed in a negative light by those who seek to limit immigrant 
admission numbers.  
However, the analysis demonstrates that family-based immigration is more 
complicated than it commonly seems. The term chain migration creates the illusion that 
the family-based immigration system currently in place allows one immigrant to sponsor 
many more new immigrants, who may or may not fit American needs. Studies show, 
however, that family-based immigration brings in a significant level of educated workers, 
supports U.S. economic growth, and provides the country with needed labor supply. 
Arguments that family-based immigrants hurt native-born wages and limit employment 
                                                 
7 Matt Kwong, “Trump Wants an Immigration System ‘Like They Have in Canada.’ Would a Merit-
Based Plan Work in the U.S.?” CBC, April 30, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/trump-immigration-
system-canada-merit-based-points-1.5115475. 
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opportunities for other low-skilled workers are unsubstantiated. The threshold for 
admission may be the relationship to a U.S. relative; however, family-based immigrants 
bring varied skills needed for a competitive economy.8  
The analysis demonstrates that the immigration apparatus in place has led to excess 
wait times, has kept families apart, and has led to temporary solutions to bring skilled 
workers to the United States.9 Unsurprisingly, the current immigration policies generated 
a demand that far exceeds the number of available immigrant visas. Inflexible per-country 
ceilings and numerical limitations that have remained unchanged for thirty years contribute 
to excessive backlogs.10 The combination of numerical limits and per-country caps leads 
to significant delays for employers who seek to bring labor to or keep labor in the United 
States. Furthermore, while family-based immigrants do make up a large share of the total 
annual immigrant admissions, the system does place limits on the number. Immigration 
statutes prevent family-based immigrants from saturating the U.S. immigration system. 
The discourse surrounding family-based immigration creates the perception of an 
unrestricted immigration system, but established numerical limitations counter that 
argument. 
The United States functions on an immigration system that is intended to bring in 
streams of both family-based and skilled-based immigrants. Solutions for improving the 
existing system have focused less on remedying the mechanisms in place and more on 
overhauling the structure to reflect a points-based system, which selects immigrants based 
on the desirability of their attributes. The current administration looks to Canada’s points-
based system, which has helped Canada bring in highly skilled and educated immigrants. 
                                                 
8 Cecilia Muñoz, “The Myth of Chain Migration,” POLITICO, January 26, 2018, 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/26/myth-chain-migration-trump-family-immigration-
216536. 
9 David Bier, Immigration Wait Times from Quotas Have Doubled: Green Card Backlogs Are Long, 
Growing, and Inequitable, Policy Analysis 873 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2019), 
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-873-updated.pdf. 
10 Donald Kerwin and Robert Warren, “National Interests and Common Ground in the U.S. 
Immigration Debate: How to Legalize the U.S. Immigration System and Permanently Reduce its 
Undocumented Population,” Journal on Migration and Human Security 5, no. 2 (2017): 307, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/233150241700500205. 
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A comparative analysis with Canada is conducted to explain how a points-based system 
works and why Canada has implemented such a system. The analysis also provides 
perspective on whether screening immigrants is an effective way to meet a country’s 
national interests, particularly economic interests, and whether other factors should be 
considered. Ultimately, the research demonstrates that the true lesson in Canada’s 
immigration polices lies in its flexibility rather than in its ability to bring in more skilled 
labor. Canada’s system has been successful due to legislation that requires a yearly 
administrative review of the immigration system. This requirement results in a system that 
is continuously being assessed for effectiveness. In comparison, the United States’ 
immigration policies cannot be administratively changed easily; they require policy 
development through legislative action. Politically this has been far from easy, resulting in 
the lack of significant immigration reforms since 1990.  
While Canada’s system has prioritized the skilled and educated, the points system 
also rewards individuals who have preexisting connections to the country, like family 
members, which is often not noted in comparative analyses. Thus, Canada’s system also 
recognizes the importance of social ties to an immigrant’s success in the country. Family-
based immigration has been a point of contention for those seeking to limit U.S. 
immigration levels and admit more skilled-based immigrants. This review demonstrates 
that there is merit in the established networks and wide-range of skills that family-based 
immigrants bring to the United States. Proposals that gloss over the current functions of 
the immigration system dismiss the realities of why the current system cannot meet its 
national interests. 
This thesis finds that U.S. immigration policies should be continuously developed 
in order to support a spectrum of national interests. Through analysis of U.S. and Canadian 
immigration policies, this thesis recommends that the U.S. government create an 
immigration system that allows for different pathways for legal immigration while 
recognizing the value that family-based immigration brings to the United States. A well-
managed immigration system is one that allows both family unity and the migration of 
skilled workers. Common-sense immigration reform requires more than looking toward 
foreign partners for solutions; it requires us to review what is currently in place and to 
xix 
identify ways to enhance existing policies. The government should allow for more 
flexibility in its immigration system; for instance, policymakers should create new visa 
categories to alleviate backlogs and consider allowing U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services to have more administrative control over immigrant admissions. Also, increasing 
immigrant visa allocations for skilled-based immigrants can help bring in more skilled 
labor to the United States. We can also use market data to meet labor shortages, eliminate 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Family reunification has long been a central goal of U.S. immigration policy.1 While 
other comparable countries, such as Canada, prefer to admit individuals based on their skills, 
the United States accepts more individuals due to family ties than any other immigrant visa 
category.2 Americans who favor restricting immigration argue that a system heavily reliant on 
family-based immigration is problematic because it “monopolizes” the immigration system.3 
Family-based migration (or what some refer to as chain migration) occurs when one individual 
in the United States sponsors a relative who immigrates to the United States, and in turn that 
relative sponsors another relative, and so on. Family-based immigration does not screen 
potential immigrants for their skills or potential value to the country.4  
The issue of giving weight to an individual’s skills rather than familial ties is 
increasingly the focus of many U.S. immigration reform debates.5 Critics of the current family-
based immigration system argue that a merit-based system (also known as a points-based 
system) would best meet U.S. needs, especially those pertaining to economic interests.6 They 
also argue that the existing immigration system fails to meet the needs of the country as it 
                                                 
1 Congressional Budget Office, Immigration Policy in the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Congress, February 2006), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7051/02-28-
immigration.pdf. 
2 Zoya Gubernskaya and Joanna Dreby, “US Immigration Policy and the Case for Family Unity,” 
Journal on Migration and Human Security 5, no. 2 (2017): 418. 
3 Peter Brimelow, “The Real Cost of Immigration,” Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 
23, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 288. 
4 Immigration: The Economic Impact: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 109th 
Cong. (2006) (statement of Barry Chiswick, UIC Professor). 
5 “The RAISE Act: What Lies beneath the Proposed Points System?” American Immigration Council, 
August 2017, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
the_raise_act_what_lies_beneath_the_proposed_points_system.pdf. 
6 S., Immigration. 
2 
progresses toward a knowledge and innovation economy.7 These arguments suggest that, in a 
competitive global market, the United States should focus on bringing in immigrants who have 
the skill sets that will give the country a competitive edge. Opponents of the current family-
based system also believe it encourages the migration of low-skilled workers, who are seen as 
harmful to both American wages and the labor market.8 Such discourse on immigration is a 
contentious issue at the center of the political stage. Polarizing views make it challenging to 
discuss likely changes to U.S. immigration policy. As such, this thesis evaluates what it means 
to reform the current family-based immigration system in favor of a system that is points-based.  
The United States currently has an admissions process for employment-based 
immigrant categories that require a variety of skills.9 The system has categories for both 
temporary and permanent workers, of low- and high-skilled occupations.10 However, it does 
not encompass all the requirements a point-based system would. This policy proposal may lead 
to unclear consequences because the United States has narrow experience with a points-based 
system. Changing the current immigration system and adopting one that emphasizes skill and 
education could drastically change U.S. demographics and the economy. Policymakers could 
grasp the costs and benefits of such a policy by examining a democracy that already uses a 
points-based system.  
Canada is an example of a country that is similar to the United States but uses a points-
based system to bring in highly skilled immigrants who contribute to the country’s economy 
and meet its labor demands.11 This thesis conducts a comparative analysis that first looks at 
                                                 
7 Tom Cotton and David Perdue, “Reforming American Immigration for a Stronger Economy Act 
(RAISE Act): A Bill to Raise Working Wages & Boost American Competitiveness” (fact sheet, 
Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 2017), https://www.perdue.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
170801_New_RAISE_Act_One_Pager_FINAL.pdf. 
8 David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So Bad? NBER Working Paper No. 11547 (Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005), 1, http://www.nber.org/papers/w11547. 
9 Congressional Budget Office, Immigration Policy in the United States. 
10 Lawrence Brunner and Joseph Pate, “Promoting Entry of High-Quality Workers through U.S. 
Immigration Policy,” Applied Economics 48, no. 52 (2016): 5046, https://doi.org/10.1080/
00036846.2016.1170933. 
11 Law Library of Congress, Points-Based Immigration Systems: Australia, Canada, United Kingdom 
(Washington, DC: Law Library of Congress, 2013), 19, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/points-based-
immigration/Points-Based%20Immigration%20Systems.pdf. 
3 
the needs of the two countries, and then examines Canada’s current immigration policy. It also 
provides sources of evaluation for the potential implications of embracing such a system in the 
United States. The findings of this thesis demonstrate that the current U.S. immigration 
apparatus is more complicated than the political debate suggests. While there is a need for more 
skilled workers in the United States, it is not necessarily the case that a system that prioritizes 
family-based immigrants is the problem.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• How are U.S. national interests defined in immigration polices? 
• Do current U.S. immigration policies support U.S. national interests? 
• Based on the comparative analysis with Canada, what immigration policy 
reforms would best support U.S. national interests? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines competing immigration policy attitudes that contribute 
to the ongoing discussions of immigrant admissions. The following sections present existing 
arguments regarding the economic consequences of family-based immigrants, the use of 
family reunification for both inclusionary and exclusionary immigration practices, and the 
added value of human capital in immigration reform.  
1. The Economics of Crafting U.S. Immigration Policy 
Several immigration scholars and economists believe immigration policies have 
vacillated between attitudes of embracing and outright rejecting immigration.12 The 
economics of the country have played a significant role in creating those divisions. The 
literature regarding economics and their role in immigration can be polemic, with opinions 
fluctuating between the negative and positive effects immigrants have had on the U.S. 
economy. Much of the literature found on this topic centers on those who decide to migrate 
                                                 
12 Steven G. Koven and Frank Gotzke, American Immigration Policy: Confronting the Nation’s 
Challenges (New York: Springer, 2010), 20. 
4 
(theories of migration), the impact immigrants have on native-born workers’ wages, and the 
impact immigration has on the U.S. labor market (employment opportunities).  
Heavily cited by other researchers on both sides of the immigration debate, 
immigration scholar and economist George J. Borjas has written extensively on the economics 
of immigration. One of his central arguments is that the average skills of the immigrant 
population into the United States have declined.13 Borjas attributes some of that decline to the 
change in the “national-origin mix” of the immigrant population, one that has shifted from 
primarily European to Latino and Asian immigrants.14 Additionally, much of Borjas’s work 
appears to attribute the increase in low-skilled labor in the past decades to Latino immigrants 
who have entered the United States. Borjas maintains that immigrants have affected the wages 
of American workers, especially immigrants who are not highly skilled and have minimal 
education.15 The rationale behind this notion is that while low-skilled immigration causes the 
wages of high-skilled workers to rise, competition for low-skilled labor increases, thereby 
reducing the wages of native-born workers and increasing income inequality.16 The Center for 
Immigration Studies, a nonpartisan research organization that supports policies that restrict 
immigration, echoes many of Borjas’s sentiments. The center argues that the current 
immigration flow has allowed lower-skilled individuals into the country and has harmed the 
poorest and least-educated American-born workers.17  
Journalist Peter Brimelow, known for his anti-immigration stance, has used Borjas’s 
work to support his ideas about the economics of immigration. Brimelow argues that 
immigration affects native-born income as well as causes an immigration surplus that results 
in a net loss for Americans.18 He claims that current U.S. immigration policies have allowed 
                                                 
13 George J. Borjas, Issues in the Economics of Immigration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2000), 5. 
14 Borjas, 5–6. 
15 Koven and Gotzke, American Immigration Policy, 54. 
16 Dell Champlin, “Institutionalist Perspectives on Immigration Policy: An Update,” Journal of 
Economic Issues 44, no. 2 (2010): 302, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20778674. 
17 Steven A. Camarota, “Immigration Is Hurting the U.S. Worker,” Americas Quarterly (Spring 
2007), https://cis.org/Immigration-Hurting-US-Worker. 
18 Carol M. Swain, Debating Immigration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 164. 
5 
“deteriorating skill levels, on average, relative to the native-born.”19 Like Borjas, Brimelow 
attributes the declining wages of native-born workers to low-skilled immigrants from specific 
countries, illustrating a bias against individuals from Asian and Latin American countries. 
Those arguments are contingent on existing immigration policies, which have contributed to 
the increase of Latino and Asian populations currently in the United States.20 
Opposing those views, Dell Champlin finds that arguments about the negative 
consequences of low-skilled immigration have played a role in ineffective immigration 
policies.21 Champlin challenges the validity of such arguments, claiming that they ignore how 
labor markets work. She believes the impact on wages is not a result of low-skilled labor but 
transformations in specific industries.22 Champlin is not alone in her claims that immigration 
has a minimal effect on native-born workers’ wages. Daniel Griswold, a journalist and scholar, 
also believes that immigration is not the cause of low wages; he attributes low wages, rather to 
“the combined effect of international trade and technological change.”23 He argues that 
limiting low-skilled immigrants will not resolve the impact the changing economy already has 
on native-born workers with few skills and little education.24 He sees low-skilled immigration 
as an incentive for native-born workers to increase their skills in other competitive fields. 
Some scholars see no correlation between the immigration of low-skilled workers and 
the wages of native-born workers.25 David Card’s study on the issue, for instance, reveals that 
despite the influx of low-skilled immigrants across different U.S. cities, the wages of low-
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skilled native workers have remained the same since 1980.26 His survey focuses on the effects 
of low-skilled immigration on native-born workers who do not have a high school diploma. 
The Cato Institute, known for its support of liberal immigration policies, has refuted 
many of the arguments made against immigrants and their adverse economic impacts. 
According to the Cato Institute, immigration of low-skilled immigrants has a minimal effect 
on the wages of native-born workers. Moreover, the minimal costs of immigration are offset 
by the labor supply, resulting in low prices and additional goods for Americans.27 
Furthermore, there appears to be a consensus among the researchers previously mentioned that 
policies restricting immigration shrink the labor market and can hurt Americans in the long 
run.  
As this review has revealed, the conclusions of academics who have studied the 
economic effects of immigration vary. Some see negative economic consequences while 
others see positive effects, and the purported extent of the effects varies. The differing 
frameworks contribute to the already contested issue of who should be allowed to 
immigrate. Therefore, the economic effects of immigration, especially the immigration of 
low-skilled immigrants, will continue to play an active role in opinions of how immigration 
policy should be crafted or changed.  
2. The Controversy behind the Family Reunification Policy  
The importance of family is interwoven in American values. Whether it has been to 
limit or increase immigration to the United States, family reunification has been significant to 
both the admissions and regulation of U.S. immigrants.28 Before the passing of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 amendments also known as the Hart–Celler Act 
(hereafter referred to as the 1965 Act), U.S. immigration was regulated by a national origins 
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quota system that was “designed to maintain racial homogeneity.”29 The 1965 Act has been 
seen as the turning point in U.S. immigration policy as it eliminated race provisions and 
established a system that focused on family reunification and skills.30 Since the passage of the 
1965 Act, there have been conflicting interpretations of its intended purpose. Notably, some 
scholars have argued that the family reunification provisions were intended to maintain racial 
homogeneity in the United States while others have suggested that the framers of the act 
envisioned a progressive and diversified America.  
There is a consensus among immigration scholars that the 1965 Act was one of the 
most significant reforms to U.S. immigration law.31 According to some, despite its intentions, 
the act contributed immensely to changes in the racial and ethnic makeup of America, whether 
celebrated or not.32 The intended (or unintended) demographic changes remain a point of 
contention among immigration restrictionists and advocates alike. Contemporary immigration 
advocates embrace the idea that the 1965 Act intended to follow the example of the civil rights 
movement, reversing years of race-based exclusionary practices in U.S. immigration 
policies.33 Gabriel J. Chin, a legal scholar, believes that the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 not only paved the way for the 1965 Act but 
commemorated the general disposition of Congress during that period, which aimed to 
establish a progressive, outward-looking role for the United States on the world stage.34  
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It could be argued that the 1965 Act, indeed, was the first piece of federal immigration 
legislation that advocated for a race-neutral policy for immigrant admissions. Before its 
passing, immigration policies had been crafted to maintain the European makeup of the United 
States. Professor Elizabeth Keyes claims that not only was the 1965 Act a component of the 
civil rights movement, “removing color-barriers from our laws,” but that the framers 
“consciously saw their role as crafting another piece of civil rights legislation.”35 Keyes 
interprets the 1965 Act as representing liberal immigration beliefs, signifying the end of racial 
intolerance for immigration admissions. Her view is supported by other scholars who 
understand the legislation as undoing the injustices of prior U.S. immigration practices.36 Seen 
as a modern piece of immigration legislation, the 1965 Act opened the United States to 
diversity by eliminating racial discrimination and embracing the sanctity of family unity. 
Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy, an original supporter of the 1965 Act, claimed that 
America’s “ethnic mix” would not change because of the bill.37 His comments have supported 
a different school of thought, especially from nativists who argue that the act was crafted to 
continue constructing race and identity in America. For example, Joseph E. Fallon argues that 
the 1965 Act promised to keep immigration numbers low, not compromise the ethnic makeup 
of the United States, and conserve immigration mostly from Europe.38 Instead, however, he 
claims that the act increased immigration from third-world countries, destroying the European 
identity of America.39 That type of rhetoric is used in support of amending the family 
reunification provisions established by the 1965 Act—specifically, the perceived issues with 
chain migration, which has allowed immigrants from less-desirable countries to bring in 
additional family members.  
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The consequences of the 1965 Act are seen primarily as unintended, including the 
changing face of America that followed.40 Supporters of the act had familial ties to eastern and 
southern Europe.41 Thus, the push for the legislation came from the belief that the proposed 
family reunification reforms would promote immigration from Europe.42 Unlike the 
previously cited view of a new, tolerant America, this idea suggests that the drafters of the bill 
believed that America would stay predominantly white.  
The conflicting frameworks behind the true intentions of the 1965 Act should not 
overshadow the essential role that the value of family unity played in that reform, and the value 
that family unity will play in future proposed immigration reforms. Political sociologist 
Catherine Lee states that the concept of family and family reunification in immigration means 
much more than just the physical aspect of keeping immigrant families together.43 She argues 
that family reunification provisions are part of a wider conversation about what family 
symbolizes and how it has been used by policymakers to drive particular policy objectives.44 
Supporters of the legislation have leveraged family unity, presenting it as a national interest 
and one that gives Americans the opportunity to bring their family members together. 
Therefore, while the 1965 Act did represent the end of the national origins quota policy, it also 
showed family reunification as a political tool to pass immigration reform. Additionally, its 
political use has illustrated that it can be a tool for inclusionary or exclusionary practices by 
those competing to shape a national identity.  
3. Merit-Based Immigration 
Determining who should be selected to immigrate to the United States has been a 
significant policy challenge for lawmakers. The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) argues that 
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since the 1965 Act, the United States stopped using immigration as a “nation-building tool.”45 
Instead, the current family-based immigration system has allowed immigrants to self-select, a 
point of contention for restrictionists. For example, Dale L. Wilcox, a proponent of restrictive 
immigration policies, claims that allowing immigrants to self-select has taken away the 
government’s ability to have a say in who is admitted and fails to consider the country’s actual 
needs.46 He also believes that the current family-based immigration system is nepotistic, as it 
allows family members to petition for each other.47 Similar opinions have prompted some 
legislators and immigration restrictionists to propose modifications to the current system that 
will promote education and skill.48  
Jeanne Batalova, a senior policy analyst with MPI, argues that historically skilled 
immigrants have generally been well received in U.S. immigration policies, even during times 
of restriction.49 This is an accurate assessment of the current U.S. immigration discourse. 
Restrictionists who advocate for lower immigration numbers see the importance of instituting 
a system that values merit over family to fulfill U.S. economic needs.50 The belief is that highly 
skilled immigrants will always be more advantageous to U.S. economic interests than low-
skilled immigrants.51  
Merit-based immigration (or a points-based system) would allow the government to 
dictate who is admitted into the country. Generally, under points-based systems, governments 
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first create a list of characteristics they see as important, intending immigrants then apply for 
admission, the immigrants are assigned specific points, and those who meet a determined point 
threshold are granted immigrant visas.52 The categories could range from education level, to 
language proficiency, to work experience, to age. Researchers with the MPI call this approach 
a “human-capital accumulation formula [that primarily] seeks to increase the population of 
workers whose skills, education, and other attributes are either thought to be in short supply or 
otherwise of intrinsic economic value to an economy.”53 This type of policy approach is often 
lauded for its perceived capacity to assess a prospective immigrant’s ability to participate in 
the economy and broader society.54 It also ensures that the U.S. government is acquiring the 
“best and brightest” immigrants.  
There have been varying studies on points-based systems and their effectiveness. In 
2016, researchers from Central Michigan University simulated a point system on U.S. 
immigrant flows to show how the admission of skilled immigrants would be beneficial. They 
illustrate how a system that considers education, an age preference for immigrants under forty, 
and professional job experience could ease the use of transfer programs by current immigrants, 
increase wages, and reduce income inequality.55 The study appears to have been skewed with 
assumptions that immigrants significantly use government social programs. Additionally, the 
populations used in the case study do not reflect those immigrants the researchers sought to 
quantify—newly arrived legal immigrants. Instead, the study used data from a mix of 
immigrants, including undocumented immigrants.  
In 2010, the Public Policy Institute of California published a study using the 
comprehensive immigration reform proposal of 2007 to illustrate whether immigrants admitted 
in 2003 would still be admitted under the proposed points-based system.56 That study found a 
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significant number of immigrants would continue to be admitted based on family-based 
preferences, humanitarian reasons, and skills.57 The researchers found that immigrants from 
high-skilled occupations would increase, but not necessarily immigrants with the skills needed 
for in-demand occupations, which are what supporters of points-based systems want to 
promote.  
Researchers from the Institute for the Study of Labor compared the 1990 and 1991 
census data of Australia and Canada, countries that both used points-based systems, with 
census data from the United States. The study revealed that immigrants from the points-based 
countries had better language proficiency, education, and income but that the larger population 
of Latin American immigrants in the United States was a factor.58 Ultimately, the researchers 
could not conclusively determine that a points-based system would significantly improve the 
skills of U.S. immigrants or reduce the number of immigrants from Latin America.59 Authors 
Guillermina Jasso and Mark R. Rosenzweig found that assessing a prospective immigrant on 
his or her skills is not necessarily telling of the individual’s overall success in the United 
States.60 They note that family-based immigrants, specifically marital immigrants, have 
additional sources of support that allow for upward mobility overall.61 Other authors agree that 
skills alone are not a suitable indicator for economic success or the ability to assimilate, as 
family and community ties play an essential role in an immigrant’s progress.62 The previous 
research on the effectiveness of a merit-based system cannot conclusively show that such a 
system would improve the type of immigrant admitted to the United States.  
                                                 
57 Hill and Hayes, 21. 
58 Heather Antecol, Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, and Stephen J. Trejo, “Immigration Policy and the Skills 
of Immigrants to Australia, Canada, and the United States,” discussion paper no. 363 (Bonn: Institute for 
the Study of Labor, 2001), 5–15, https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp363.html. 
59 Antecol, Cobb-Clark, and Trejo, 15. 
60 Guillermina Jasso and Mark R. Rosenzweig, “Do Immigrants Screened for Skills Do Better Than 
Family Reunification Immigrants?” International Migration Review 29, no. 1 (1995): 86, https://doi.org/
10.2307/2546998. 
61 Jasso and Rosenzweig, 86. 
62 Hill and Hayes, “Selecting for Skill,” 22. 
13 
4. Literature Review Summary
Current immigration reform debates have centered on adopting an immigration policy 
that admits immigrants based on merit. Arguments against family-based immigration are based 
heavily on the perceived economic impact on native-worker wages and a failure to attract the 
best-skilled immigrant for the evolving global market. This literature review demonstrates how 
immigration policy in the United States is influenced by opposing viewpoints surrounding 
what type of immigrant is best for the country. When assessing the effectiveness of a merit-
based system, policymakers must carefully ensure that proposed policies are not rooted in 
biases against certain immigrant groups. Creating immigration policy should be a result of 
what best supports U.S. national interests, not in furtherance of policy objectives to change 
America’s national identity.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN
In this research, two key components in the current immigration policy are analyzed: 
family reunification and employment-based immigration. It is important to understand the 
current system and its deficiencies in order to understand the challenges of continuing with the 
status quo or seeking change. This study does not cover the full history of U.S. immigration 
policies but uses historical and present-day data on U.S. immigration policies and issues to 
draw conclusions about what is working, or not working, in the current system.  
        As outlined in the literature review, past and current proposals for immigration policy 
change have called for a shift from family-based immigration to the use of a merit-based 
system for granting legal permanent residency. Since the United States has limited experience 
with a merit-based system, a comparative analysis with Canada is conducted to explain how a 
merit-based system works and why a country might implement such a system. Canada has a 
points-based system in place, with the majority of its immigrant admissions coming from 
“economic migrants,” but also has a family-based system.63 A comparative analysis between 
the United States and Canada helps provide a perspective on whether screening immigrants is 
63 Hill and Hayes. 
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an effective way to meet a country’s national interests, particularly those pertaining to the 
national economy, and whether other factors must be considered.  
Finally, opponents of the current family-based system point to its inability to meet the 
needs of a changing national economy. As such, this study examines the economic implications 
of the current family-based immigration system. This analysis uses past and current 
immigration laws and policies, census data, economic figures, and other studies. This thesis 
also draws from a variety of scholarly journals, congressional reports, surveys, and government 
databases to form conclusions about the current system and whether it meets economic 
interests.  
This thesis is limited to U.S. immigration policy as it relates to family- and skill-based 
immigration. This thesis does not cover all other current U.S. immigration pathways or 
recommend comprehensive immigration reform. Instead, this thesis offers policymakers 
insight into the implications of adopting a merit-based immigration system. 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE
Chapter II reviews landmark immigration legislation, how U.S. national interests have
been defined in the legislation, and the current redefinition of national interest in the present-
day discourse regarding immigration. Chapter III looks at the current U.S. immigration system, 
reviewing how it works and its deficiencies. Chapter IV further explores family-based 
immigration, reviewing the actualities behind family-based immigration, and presents 
Canada’s points-based system. Finally, Chapter V concludes with findings and 
recommendations. 
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II. HOW WE GOT HERE: U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES 
The current Trump administration has called for adopting “an immigration system 
that serves the national interest.”64 However, the concept of “national interest” can be 
nebulous; it is often used by policymakers to advocate for specific policy changes or for 
interests they seek to protect. Immigration proposals throughout the years have, therefore, 
defined national interest differently, in accordance with the economic and political 
environment at the moment. Open immigration policies reflect periods of economic 
growth, while restrictive immigration policies reflect periods of mistrust or economic 
insecurities.  
A study of national interest in U.S. immigration policy—past interests and those 
currently proposed—will help establish the parameters for determining whether or not the 
current immigration system meets those interests. The review will illustrate how national 
interest has been redefined throughout the years to serve widely varied functions. This 
chapter reviews landmark immigration legislation, the definition of national interest in 
those laws, and the current redefinition of national interest in the present-day discourse 
regarding immigration.  
A. DEFINING NATIONAL INTEREST IN IMMIGRATION POLICY  
“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she 
with silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor, 
your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!” 
—Emma Lazarus, poet, 188365 
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Emma Lazarus’s poem “The New Colossus” has come to symbolize freedom and 
hope for immigrants coming to the United States in pursuit of better opportunities.66 It 
symbolizes the country as a beacon for—and a nation of—immigrants. In America’s 
formative years, immigration was encouraged, open, and rarely questioned by the 
government. Immigration restrictions emerged as economic and political conditions 
changed. During times of economic prosperity, immigration was relatively welcomed, but 
this shifted as the economy weakened following the Civil War.67 As immigrant numbers 
and accusations of immigrants stealing jobs increased, the anti-immigrant sentiment also 
grew. In 1875, in response to individual states passing their own immigration laws, the 
Supreme Court gave the federal government control of enacting immigration legislation.68 
What followed was a series of historical laws that played a significant role in shaping the 
United States’ current immigration system. The following is not a comprehensive review 
of all U.S. immigration policies but considers those that have had significant implications 
on the current discourse surrounding immigration reform.  
1. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 
Changes in immigration legislation usually result from fear. Fear of losing 
something—such as security, democracy, or constitutional rights—has long motivated 
policy change in the United States.69 Historically, those seeking to limit immigration have 
characterized immigrants as a threat to national security, to economic opportunities for 
Americans, or to America’s national identity. Such views have shaped restrictive 
immigration practices in the United States.  
One of the first federal immigration laws aimed at halting immigrants was the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The law responded to the anti-Chinese sentiment that arose 
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from some Americans’ belief that Chinese immigrants were stealing jobs and lowering 
American wages. Economic opportunities from the railroad industry had increased Chinese 
labor in California, which led to a pro-American laborer movement that fomented the anti-
Chinese sentiment.70 The 47th Congress enacted this legislation, purportedly in the interest 
of the working class. Thus, the Chinese Exclusion Act defined national interest as the 
protection of the economic wellbeing of the working class. In the statute, Congress 
declares: 
Whereas, in the opinion of the Government of the United States the coming 
of Chinese laborers to this country endangers the good order of certain 
localities within the territory thereof: Therefore, be it enacted … [that] the 
coming of Chinese laborers to the United States be … suspended; and 
during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer to 
come.71 
As one of the first federal policies that restricted immigration based on race and 
ethnicity, the act led to future immigration practices that used nationality to control 
immigration into the country. Meanwhile, immigration from northern and western Europe 
remained unrestricted. Notably, supporters never called up racial grounds to pass the 
policy; they used the core belief concerning a lack of employment opportunities for 
Americans. The movement derided Chinese immigrants, and the lawmakers pitted the 
American working laborer against the Chinese to garner support for the legislation.72 In 
support of the policy, Senator James Blaine stated, “I am pleading the cause of the free 
American laborer … and of his children … and of his children’s children.”73 Blaine 
associated the struggles of the working class during that period with the purported impact 
that Chinese immigrants had on U.S. citizens’ family and future prosperity.  
                                                 
70 John F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants, revised and enlarged edition (New York: Harper & Row, 
1964), 72. 
71 An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese, 47th Cong., 1st sess. (1882), 
§ 126. 
72 Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 239, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/
detail.action?docID=880176. 
73 Bill Moyers, “Gold Mountain Dreams,” March 25, 2003, https://billmoyers.com/content/gold-
mountain-dreams/. 
18 
2. The Gradual Introduction of a National-Origins Quota System  
America must be kept American. For this purpose, it is necessary to 
continue a policy of restricted immigration … insure the admission of those 
with the largest capacity and best intention of becoming citizens … 
economic and social conditions warrant a limitation of those to be admitted. 
—President Calvin Coolidge, 192374 
In his first annual message to Congress, President Coolidge provided a framework 
for what he hoped to accomplish during his presidency. Following the end of World War 
I, a slowing economy and the return of U.S. soldiers heightened anti-immigrant 
sentiment.75 What followed was a system that introduced further restrictions on immigrant 
admissions. National interest during that period involved controlling the racial and ethnic 
makeup of the United States. A mistrust of foreigners, fear of excess cheap labor, and the 
belief that new immigrants were not assimilating facilitated the passing of the Immigration 
Act of 1924, also known as the Johnson–Reed Act.76 The legislation created a national-
origins quota system that essentially restricted, or altogether prohibited, the immigration 
of people of certain nationalities to the United States.77 The state restricted immigrant 
admissions to two percent of the foreign-born population in the United States based on the 
1890 census. The act also significantly reduced immigration from eastern and southern 
Europe and barred immigration from Japan entirely because of emerging hostilities with 
the country.78 The legislation played a significant role in shaping the racial composition of 
immigrants for decades to follow. It also allowed the federal government to legitimize an 
anti-immigrant agenda in U.S. immigration policy.  
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In the 1950s, the political environment in the United States significantly changed 
due to the expanding Cold War, igniting a new debate on what, and whom, the U.S. 
immigration system should favor. With McCarthyism in the background, a lingering sense 
of fear from communist influence was stoked, leading to the narrowing of immigration 
policy as a matter of national security.79 However, a strengthening public opinion felt that 
the existing immigration restrictions needed to be relaxed as a matter of foreign policy or 
for humanitarian reasons.80 Nevertheless, in 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
also known as the McCarran–Walter Act (referred to hereafter as the 1952 Act), codified 
existing immigration legislation, allowing the national-origins quota system to continue.  
The 1952 Act reformed existing policy by allocating a large percentage of available 
immigration quotas to western European countries; it scarcely opened immigration to 
Asian countries, and established a preference system.81 The 1952 Act also introduced the 
selection of immigrants based on their skill set and family ties.82 President Harry S. 
Truman opposed the bill, expressing concerns that the limited reforms did not meet the 
needs of the country. Truman defined America’s national interests as promoting economic 
growth, restoring American principles, supporting humanitarian needs, and advancing the 
country’s role as a global leader. According to this definition, restricting immigration based 
on nationality was not only discriminatory but also went against the American principle 
that “all men are created equal.”83 In his veto message to the House of Representatives, 
Truman remarked:  
But now this desirable provision comes before me embedded in a mass of 
legislation which would perpetuate injustices of long standing against many 
other nations of the world ... the basis of this quota system was false and 
unworthy in 1924. It is even worse now. At the present time, this quota 
system keeps out the very people we want to bring in … enacting into law 
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such a slur on the patriotism, the capacity, and the decency of a large part 
of our citizenry.84 
Truman viewed the legislation as a hindrance to the United States’ progress; in part, 
immigration policy was an important component in building the country’s foreign 
relationships. A review of the Immigration Act of 1924 and the 1952 Act illustrates how 
administrations used the immigration system to carry out ambiguous policy objectives. 
National interest in the Immigration Act of 1924 concerned protecting American traditions 
(e.g., language, religion, and culture). The national-origins quota system was a way to 
preserve America’s national identity. In contrast to the Chinese Exclusion Act, guarantees 
of economic security for working Americans played a secondary role in the legislation.  
Nationalism continued to be bolstered years after the Immigration Act of 1924. In 
the 1952 Act, national interest revolved less around economic security and more around 
national security—guarding the United States against foreign influence on its democracy. 
Yet, allowing the national-origins quota system to move forward was a means to continue 
landscaping the racial-ethnic composition of the country. While the 1952 Act failed to 
abolish the national-origins quota system, it set a precedent for recognizing family 
reunification as an important objective of U.S. immigration policy.  
3. The Immigration Nationality Act of 1965  
The civil rights movement changed the political and social environment of the 
United States, setting the stage for one of America’s most significant immigration reforms. 
Commonly described as the “cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy,” the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1965, also known as the Hart–Celler Act (hereafter referred to as 
the 1965 Act) made significant amendments to U.S. immigration policy. National interest 
during that period shifted to create a policy that would be forward-looking and inclusive. 
Policymakers who supported the legislation successfully eliminated the national-origins 
quota system. A race-neutral policy, the 1965 Act shifted the focus to family and skill-
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based immigrant admissions. On October 3, 1965, on Liberty Island in New York Harbor, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the immigration bill, remarking: 
The bill says that from this day forth those wishing to immigrate to America 
shall be admitted on the basis of their skills and their close relationship to 
those already here. This is a simple test, and it is a fair test. Those who can 
contribute most to this country—to its growth, to its strength, to its spirit—
will be the first that are admitted to this land.85 
National interest in the legislation was defined as achieving family unity, meeting 
labor demands, and affording refuge to individuals fleeing their home countries. With the 
civil rights movement in the background, the 1965 Act guaranteed U.S. immigrant 
admissions would be based on criteria other than race. Advocates for immigration reform 
saw the national-origins quota system as undemocratic and contradictory to American 
ideals.86 The family unity part of the legislation became a focal point, emphasizing that 
family separation is immoral.87 Moreover, the need for immigration reform was equally 
important for the United States to be a global leader.  
The 1965 Act was a significant piece of immigration legislation; it increased the 
number of immigrants and changed the ethnic makeup of the immigrant population.88 
Before the act’s amendments, about 70 percent of visa allocations were afforded to 
individuals from Ireland, Germany, and the United Kingdom.89 The family reunification 
and skill-based provisions allowed individuals from Latin America, Asia, and Caribbean 
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countries to immigrate in greater numbers.90 Consequently, immigration to the United 
States shifted from mostly European to primarily Latino and Asian countries.  
4. Immigration Controls between 1986 and 1990 
The conversation on immigration reform revived during the 1970s and 1980s as the 
United States grappled with an increase of individuals entering the country unlawfully and 
overstaying their temporary visas.91 Thus, after the landmark legislation of 1965, 
immigration reform in the 1980s focused on illegal immigration, enforcement, and border 
security. Shortly after taking office, President Ronald Reagan professed the need for 
comprehensive immigration reform:  
Our nation is a nation of immigrants … at the same time, we must ensure 
adequate legal authority to establish control over immigration … to 
strengthen enforcement of our fair labor standards and laws; and to penalize 
those who would knowingly encourage violation of our laws … 
immigration and refugee policy is an important part of our past and 
fundamental to our national interest.92 
Six years after Reagan’s statement, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA), or the Simpson–Mazzoli Act, was signed into law. IRCA helped define 
national interest as the control of immigration flow coupled with stricter enforcement of 
immigration laws. Simultaneously, it opened the door for millions of unauthorized 
immigrants to gain lawful status and become active participants in American society. 
Economic growth can be argued to be part of the national interest, as legalization allowed 
economic participation from the newly legalized immigrant population. IRCA occupied 
the middle ground between those who wanted to legalize the undocumented population in 
the United States and those who wanted stricter employer sanctions to deter the hiring of 
undocumented immigrants. IRCA provided the legalization (amnesty) of millions of 
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undocumented immigrants, imposed penalties and sanctions on employers that knowingly 
hired undocumented workers, and provided funding for border enforcement activities.93  
One of the last significant amendments by the Congress to the 1952 Act was the 
Immigration Act of 1990. Unlike IRCA, the 1990 Act focused on expanding avenues for 
legal immigration to the United States while still addressing enforcement policies.94 Many 
of the goals of the 1990 Act are relevant to the present-day discourse on immigration 
reform. The 1990 Act defined national interest as the continuance of support for keeping 
families together, while acknowledging a growing global economy that required a higher-
skilled workforce, and America’s support of creating a diverse identity. On November 29, 
1990, President George H. W. Bush made the following remarks regarding the act: 
The Act maintains our Nation’s historic commitment to family 
reunification…. This legislation will encourage the immigration of 
exceptionally talented people … will promote the initiation of new business 
in rural areas and the investment of foreign capital in our economy … in the 
interest of national security as well as the health and welfare of U.S. 
citizens.95 
The 1990 Act increased the annual cap on immigration to 675,000 immigrant 
admissions, distributing the numbers between family-based, employment-based, and 
diversity visas.96 Family-based visa allocations benefited from high admission numbers 
by receiving 480,000 of the immigration quotas. Furthermore, immediate relatives of U.S. 
citizens would not be subject to the cap. Those measures solidified the country’s 
commitment to family reunification. The act also made considerable changes to the 
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employment-based categories, shifting the focus in U.S. immigration policy from family-
based immigration to one that recognized the country’s need to expand the skill set of its 
workforce.97  
B. NATIONAL INTEREST IN TODAY’S GOVERNMENT  
The famous words of Emma Lazarus on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty 
read: “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to 
breathe free...” Under present law it would be appropriate to add: “as long 
as they come from Northern Europe, are not too tired or too poor or slightly 
ill...” 
—President John F. Kennedy, 195898 
In his book A Nation of Immigrants, President Kennedy remarked on the injustices 
of the 1952 Act as he advocated for immigration reform. To him, the debate around 
immigration reform was more than a “superficial analysis” about restricting the number of 
immigrants; it was about what the “test for admission” would be.99 Almost thirty years 
have passed since the last significant immigration reform, and the United States has been 
unable to pass legislation that would modernize the current system. Much like Kennedy’s 
determination in 1958, the immigration debate today centers on what the test for admission 
should be—that is, which test would best serve the current needs of the country while still 
encompassing the principle of being a “nation of immigrants.” 
1. Failure to Fix a Broken System  
Our current system is dysfunctional … keeping families apart … hindering 
economic growth and American global competitiveness. 
—Zoe Lofgren, 2013100 
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Historical U.S. immigration reforms have resulted in the objectives of today’s 
immigration policy: fostering family reunification, bringing in individuals with a variety 
of skills and education, providing refugee and asylum to those fleeing persecution, and 
boosting diversity in the immigration system.101 Those priorities now ignite much of the 
heated discourse around the U.S. immigration system, and some argue that the priorities 
are currently failing to meet U.S. national interests. At the root of many discussions is how 
the current system, one that prioritizes family-based immigration over skill- and education-
based immigration, cannot meet the challenges of the twenty-first century.  
The debate over the current immigration system and the need for reform started to 
percolate during the George W. Bush administration. It can be argued that an economic-
driven immigration system was seen as a national interest objective during that period. In 
2007, Senator Harry Reid, a Democrat from Nevada, introduced the Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform Act of 2007 to Congress. The bill comprised a variety of measures 
that touched on legalization, border security initiatives, and modified family and worker 
visa classifications.102 The bill would limit family-based immigration and introduce a 
point-based system for immigrant admissions.103  
While President Bush strongly supported the bill, ultimately Congress thwarted its 
passage. The president saw it as a defeat for America, as the legislation would change the 
status quo and would assure economic demands are answered.104 Ample provisions in the 
legislation favored the immigration of employment-based immigrants. Moreover, the 
proposed merit-based admission system was a shift in the test for admission, as it would 
give more weight to an individual’s skill and education levels than it would to their familial 
ties.  
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During the Barack Obama administration, immigration reform continued to be a 
pressing topic. President Obama had outlined a strategy that addressed border security and 
streamlined legal immigration, enforcement, and economic growth.105 However, 
legislation for comprehensive immigration reform failed to make much progress during his 
tenure. In 2013, the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing to discuss 
America’s immigration system. During that hearing, national interest was defined as: 
keeping the nuclear family together, bringing in highly skilled workers, and continuing 
support of refugee admissions.106 Conversely, several items were not seen as compelling 
to the national interest by the Committee on the Judiciary: admitting low-skilled workers, 
expanding the guest worker program, or expanding family-based categories (to categories 
such as siblings and adult children).107 The Committee on the Judiciary deviated from past 
discourse, as family unity narrowed to just the nuclear family. In addition, they reflected 
the belief that the United States required a competitive workforce composed of highly 
skilled workers. 
2. The Contemporary Immigration Debate  
It’s important that we have a serious debate, one that discusses the issues … 
to make sure the rhetoric is in accord with our traditions. 
—President George W. Bush, 2006108 
The contemporary discourse on immigration shows significant continuity with past 
immigration debates, continuing to be about maintaining openness, keeping a sense of 
national identity, guarding American values and principles, and debating what type of 
immigrant should be admitted.109 Since the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump, the 
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discourse on immigration has amplified. Now more than ever, discussions regarding 
immigration are part of everyday life in the United States. Shortly after taking office, 
President Trump propelled a series of executive actions on a variety of immigration 
measures. His executive actions, commentary on immigrants, and policy reforms have 
contributed to a deep polarization in the American public on how the U.S. immigration 
system should operate. In May 2019, Trump unveiled a proposal to modernize the 
immigration system, in which he remarked: 
Our proposal is pro-American, pro-immigrant, and pro-worker… And we 
want immigrants coming in. We cherish the open door that we want to 
create for our country, but a big proportion of those immigrants must come 
in through merit and skill.110 
Now, national interest is heavily about economic incentives, the safeguarding of 
the American worker, and the ability for the United States to compete in a global economy. 
The current debate invokes “emotional landmines,” stirring fears of economic loss for 
working Americans, national security threats, and loss of American identity—all of which 
contribute to current discussions about what type of immigration system serves the national 
interest.111 In May 2019, Trump unveiled his administration’s plan to modernize the U.S. 
immigration system. His immigration plan would overhaul the legal immigration system 
and expand border security initiatives. Unlike other proposals, his plan would prioritize 
highly skilled immigrants, significantly increasing admission numbers for that group. 
Family-based immigration would be limited to spouses and children. The plan would also 
eliminate the diversity visa and greatly reduce humanitarian admissions. His plan stands in 
stark contrast to the 1990 Act, which provided much of the framework for the current 
immigration system.  
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C. CONCLUSION  
A common thematic question in immigration legislation is, What best serves the 
national interest? That theme guides many of the significant immigration reforms that have 
occurred in the United States, as discussed in this chapter. The U.S. immigration system 
has been used to advance policy objectives based on different interpretations of what best 
serves the national interest. Some of the first federal immigration laws implicitly carried 
the idea that the American working class required protection from immigrants. A lack of 
economic opportunities and low wages for the American worker have long been blamed 
on immigrants. 
Likewise, nationalism played a significant role in advancing the belief that the 
American way was at risk from immigrants, who were seen as unwilling to assimilate or 
as too different from earlier immigrant populations. In the nineteenth century and at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, protecting the American national identity was seen as 
the primary national interest, and the national-origins quota system reflected this 
perception. Moreover, at the root of the national interest was advancing immigration from 
desired countries while limiting or altogether prohibiting immigration from undesired 
countries.  
Thus, in restrictive immigration policies, national interest has been about protecting 
the American worker, ensuring national security, and securing the country’s national 
identity. Unlike restrictive immigration policies, more liberal immigration policies are 
outward-looking. In open immigration policies, national interest has been about affording 
humanitarian relief, embracing the American ideals of equality, and recognizing the 
sanctity of the family. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 altered both the U.S. 
immigration system and redefined national interest. America’s image to the rest of the 
world became its national interest.  
The 1965 Act helped advance family reunification as a fundamental concept in U.S. 
immigration policy. Following the 1965 Act, immigration policies continued to focus on 
advancing the United States’ role as a global leader. The 1990 Act placed equal importance 
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upon economic growth and America’s ability to be a competitive global leader. The 1990 
Act allowed immigration to increase and shaped the United States’ multicultural image.  
What complicates immigration policymaking is the idea that some individuals will 
be let in while others will be kept out.112 This has led to ongoing debates about what the 
U.S. immigration system should or should not be, and what type of immigrant, family-
based or skilled-based, should be prioritized. Currently, some in the United States are 
calling to change the immigration system, as they believe the current system fails to support 
national interests. The current Trump administration has reverted to the belief that 
economic security (for the American worker and nation) should guide immigration reform 
and that U.S. immigration policy should favor individuals with certain skill sets and 
education. However, based on the review of past and proposed immigration legislation, 
national interests have changed depending upon contentious ideas and different perceptions 
of the political environment at the time. The following chapter reviews the current U.S. 
immigration system—how it works, the deficiencies within the system, and what changes 
are being proposed by different groups.  
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III. THE CURRENT U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
This chapter examines the current immigration system, specifically with respect to 
two groups: family-based immigrants and employment-based immigrants. Understanding 
the current system, how it operates, and its deficiencies provides context to the discussion 
about whether the system should be reformed. Although immigration proponents and 
opponents both agree that the current U.S. immigration system needs to be reformed, 
Congress has yet to pass reform due to competing opinions on policy priorities.113 
Polarized views regarding immigration levels and the type of immigrants that should be 
admitted—those seeking to be reunited with family or those who are skilled—contribute 
to the ongoing debate.  
As previously discussed, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (the 1965 
Act) and the Immigration Act of 1990 (1990 Act) significantly shaped the current system. 
The 1965 Act put family reunification at the forefront of U.S. immigration policy; as a 
consequence, family reunification continues to have a significant role in the current 
immigration system. Seen as an immigration multiplier, family-based immigrants represent 
the largest share of the immigrant population, amounting to two-thirds of total immigrants 
to the United States.114 The 1990 Act significantly increased the number of skilled and 
educated individuals who could immigrate to the United States.115 The legislation 
broadened the employment-based category, recognizing the need to have more skilled 
workers in the United States.116 However, since 1990, the number of available visas for 
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employment-based categories has remained static, irrespective of labor market or economic 
fluctuations.117 
Attempts to reform the system are challenged by the debate surrounding what type 
of immigrants the country needs more: family-based immigrants or employment-based 
immigrants. The current system has mechanisms that allow for both, as discussed in this 
chapter. This review will demonstrate the current imbalances in the U.S. immigration 
system—a system that is hindered by extensive backlogs created by immigration queues, 
and by visa quotas that have remained static for the past thirty years. The chapter concludes 
by reviewing how complications in the system have resulted in temporary solutions. 
A. BACKGROUND  
The Immigration and National Act (INA) is the governing body of law that dictates 
how foreign nationals are lawfully admitted to the United States.118 The INA also guides 
current U.S. immigration policy, which seeks to reunite families, acquire immigrants with 
desired occupation skills, boost diversity, and provide protection to refugees.119 Several 
federal agencies manage the U.S. immigration system, with the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) having primary functions.  
Two common avenues for lawful admission are to enter the United States for a 
temporary and specific period (such individuals are defined as nonimmigrants), and to 
remain in the United States permanently (individuals are defined as immigrants).120 
Immigrants granted permanent admission are classified as lawful permanent residents 
(LPRs) and are issued a Form I-551 (green card) conferring their legal status in the United 
States.121 In addition to having the opportunity to live and work freely in the United States, 
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LPRs can apply for naturalization and obtain full rights as U.S. citizens after five years.122 
Once a person becomes an LPR, he or she can also petition for family members to join 
them in the United States. Prospective immigrants must go through several steps before 
obtaining LPR status. First, a petition must be filed and approved with U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS), a DHS component that oversees the adjudication of 
immigration and naturalization benefits. The petition is filed on the intended immigrant’s 
behalf by his or her family members or by the intended U.S. employer. If the intending 
immigrant resides overseas (or does not qualify for domestic processing), the petition will 
be forwarded overseas to be processed by the U.S. Department of State.123 If the individual 
resides in the United States and qualifies to be processed domestically, he or she will 
continue processing with USCIS through a process known as adjustment of status.124  
The 1990 Act introduced what are now the permanent worldwide immigration 
numerical limits for the United States.125 Annually, 675,000 visas are available and 
divided between the following categories: family-based, employment-based, and diversity 
immigrants.126 The number of allocated visas for each category is as follows: 
• Family-based: 480,000, in addition to unused employment-based visas 
from the prior year 
• Employment-based: 140,000, in addition to unused family-sponsored visas 
from the prior year 
• Diversity immigrants: 50,000 per year127  
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For fiscal year 2017, a total of 1,127,167 individuals obtained LPR status.128 Figure 1 
provides an overview of the 2017 LPR admission numbers by category type. 
 
Figure 1. Individuals Who Obtained LPR Status, Fiscal Year 
2017129 
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Besides annual numerical limitations, per-country numerical caps also apply to the 
family-based and employment-based categories.130 The rule sets a 7 percent limit per 
country of total LPRs that can be admitted annually.131 Intending immigrants have several 
ways to obtain permanent residency in the United States. The following sections explain 
how the family-sponsored and employment-based categories work, which are the primary 
avenues of permanent immigration for the United States.  
1. Family-Based Immigration  
Family-based immigrants represent the majority of overall immigrant admissions 
to the United States. Intended family-based immigrants need to show that they have a 
familial relationship with either a U.S. citizen or an LPR; they do not need to possess any 
particular employment-based skill.132 Foreign nationals seeking admission through a 
family relationship can do so as an immediate relative of a U.S. citizen or through a family-
sponsored preference category. An immediate relative is defined as a child (unmarried and 
under twenty-one years of age), spouse, or parent of a U.S. citizen.133 Although the INA 
has established numerical limitations for family-based immigrants, immediate relatives are 
not subject to the annual cap, thus the number of family-based immigrants admitted each 
year can fluctuate and may exceed the 480,000 cap.134  
Unlike immediate relatives, family-sponsored immigrants are subject to annual 
numerical limitations and per-country numerical caps. The family-sponsored preference 
system has four distinct categories based on the petitioner’s status (U.S. citizen or LPR).135 
Family-sponsored preference category immigrants include: unmarried sons and daughters 
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(over twenty-one years of age) of U.S. citizens, spouses and children of LPRs, unmarried 
sons and daughters (over twenty-one years of age) of LPRs, married sons and daughters of 
U.S. citizens, and siblings of U.S. citizens.136 The number of visas allocated for the family 
preference categories is equal to the family-based visas (480,000), minus the number of 
immediate relatives admitted the prior year and any unused employment-based visas, or at 
least 226,000.137 Table 1 provides an overview of both immediate relative and family-
sponsored preference categories and relating numerical limitations.  
Table 1. Family-Sponsored Categories and Numerical 
Limitations138 
Category Qualifications Numerical Limit 
Total Family-Sponsored Immigrants                                 480,000 
Immediate relatives of U.S. 
citizens 
Spouses, parents, and 
children  
No limit  
Family-Sponsored Preferences                                            226,000 
1st preference  Unmarried sons and 
daughters of U.S. citizens 
23,400, plus unused visas 
from 4th preference  
2nd preference  Spouses and children of 
LPRs; unmarried sons/
daughters of LPRs 
114,200, plus unused from 
1st preference (77% of 
visas go to spouses and 
children of LPRs) 
3rd preference  Married sons/daughters of 
U.S. citizens  
23,400, plus unused from 
1st and 2nd preference  
4th preference  Siblings of U.S. citizens 65,000, plus unused visas 
from 1st–3rd preference  
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As shown, there are many ways for immediate family members and other relatives 
to qualify under a family-based immigration category. Current U.S. policy favors family 
reunification, which is demonstrated through the high quota limits of family-based 
immigration compared to other types of immigration. Family-based immigrants account 
for 66 percent of overall immigration to the United States.139 As previously described, 
there are no limits on spouses, minor children, or parents sponsored by U.S. citizens. 
However, other family members must go through the preference system, which is 
constricted by numerical limits and per-country annual caps. As shown by the intricacies 
in Table 1, family-based immigration does not equate to guaranteed admission to the 
United States.  
2. Employment-Based Immigration  
While current U.S. immigration policy favors family reunification, as shown by the 
high quota limits and multiple immigration categories under which family members of U.S. 
citizens or LPRs can qualify, current legislation also supports employment-based 
immigration. Individuals of certain professions or who have needed occupational skills or 
exceptional abilities can qualify under employment-based categories. The 1990 Act 
changed the employment-based system by expanding the number of allocated visas from 
54,000 to 140,000 (plus any unused family visas), as well as adding the investor 
category.140 Like the family-sponsored preference system, employment-based immigrants 
are subject to numerical limitations and the pre-country cap. Table 2 provides an overview 
of the five employment-based preference categories and related numerical limits.  
                                                 
139 “How the United States Immigration System Works,” American Immigration Council, October 
2019, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
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Table 2. Employment-Based Categories and Numerical 
Limitations141 
Category Qualifications Numerical Limit 
Employment-Based Preferences                                         140,000 
1st preference  
 
Priority workers (persons of 
extraordinary ability in the arts, 
science, education, business, or 
athletics; outstanding professors 
and researchers; and multinational 
executives and managers) 
40,040, plus unused from 




Members of the professions 
holding advanced degrees or 
persons of exceptional abilities in 
the sciences, art, or business 
40,040, plus unused from 
1st preference 
3rd preference Skilled workers in short supply 
with at least two years’ training or 
experience and professionals with 
baccalaureate degrees; unskilled 
workers in short supply 
40,040, plus unused from 
1st and 2nd preference (no 
more than 10,000 for 
unskilled workers) 
4th preference Special immigrants (ministers, 
other religious workers, certain 
employees of the U.S. government 
abroad, and others) 
9,940 (no more than 5,000 
for religious workers)  
 
5th preference Employment creation (investors) 9,940 (3,000 set aside for 
targeted employment areas) 
 
For the majority of employment-based immigrants, an employer sponsor is needed; 
there are a few exceptions, however, that allow individuals to self-petition.142 The first 
preference (priority workers) is for foreign nationals with “extraordinary ability in the 
sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics; outstanding professors or researchers; or 
                                                 
141 Adapted from Congressional Budget Office, Immigration Policy: An Update, Exhibit 8; U.S. 
Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Immigrant Numbers for September 2019”; Kandel, 
Permanent Legal Immigration to the United States, Table 1.  
142 William A. Kandel, Permanent Employment-Based Immigration and the Per-country Ceiling, 
CRS Report No. R45447 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 3, 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45447. 
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multinational executives and managers.”143 Individuals seeking admission due to their 
“exceptional ability” can submit a petition (Form I-140, Petition for Alien Workers) with 
USCIS without a sponsor. Individuals with an exceptional ability must show recognition 
in their respective fields, intention to continue working in that field, and that their 
admission would be advantageous for the United States.144 Professors and researchers 
seeking admission must be “recognized internationally as outstanding in a specific 
academic area.”145 Those seeking to qualify as multinational executives and managers 
need to have worked in a similar capacity with a company that has affiliations in the United 
States.146 The latter two categories require sponsorship by an employer that will submit a 
petition (Form I-140) with USCIS on their behalf.  
Individuals seeking admission under the second preference category (professionals) 
need to hold an advanced degree (master’s or above) or demonstrate an exceptional 
ability.147 A job offer is needed to qualify as second-preference-category immigrant 
worker. However, individuals can self-petition if they qualify for a waiver that 
demonstrates it would be in the national interest for them to immigrate (i.e., a health care 
professional in a needed area). The third preference is for skilled workers, professionals, 
or other workers, and requires an employer sponsor. Employment for second- or third-
preference-category immigrant workers is contingent on the U.S. labor market data. Thus, 
before an employer can submit a petition to USCIS, they must obtain an approved labor 
certification from the Department of Labor (DOL).148 The DOL will determine if the 
United States lacks the available workers for the position sought and that the prospective 
                                                 
143 “Permanent Workers,” USCIS, October 6, 2017, https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/
permanent-workers. 
144 Allocation of Immigrant Visas, 8 USC § 1153, https://uscode.house.gov/
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145 Allocation of Immigrant Visas. 
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immigrant will not displace U.S. workers and wages.149 If the DOL finds there is no labor 
shortage for the intended position, the employer must show that recruitment efforts to hire 
a U.S. worker were unsuccessful. 
Within the employment-based preference categories, there are immigrant 
classifications that are not employer-specific. The fourth category (special immigrants) is 
for ministers, religious workers, juveniles declared dependent in a U.S. court, and 
individuals employed abroad by the U.S. government. The 1990 Act created the fifth 
preference (also known as the investor visa) for prospective immigrants seeking to invest 
in the United States. Individuals in that category must invest a minimum of $1 million (or 
$500,000 in targeted employment areas), and create employment opportunities for at least 
ten U.S. workers.150 In 1992, the investor category expanded to individuals who invest in 
USCIS-designated regional centers prescribed for “promoting economic growth.”151 
Unlike the other employment-based categories, immigrants under the fifth-preference 
category are subject to a two-year conditional period for their permanent residence. They 
must demonstrate to USCIS the benefits of the investment or that they are actively 
investing in a commercial enterprise.152 Unlike family-based immigrants, employment-
based immigrants must go through additional layers of approval before they can become 
LPRs. It is a complex process that is often delayed due to the multiple steps prospective 
immigrant workers must go through. 
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B. THE IMMIGRATION APPARATUS  
The preference categories involve additional features that illustrate the complexity 
of the U.S. immigration system, and why it functions the way it does. When a petition is 
filed by or on behalf of an intended immigrant, it is assigned a priority date, which is the 
date USCIS receives the petition. That priority date serves as an individual’s position in 
the immigration queue. Irrespective of the immigrant type (family- or employment-based), 
a visa must be available for the person to immigrate. For the preference categories, a visa 
number is assigned in chronological order based on priority date and country of origin.153 
If the number of requested visas for a specific preference category exceeds the number of 
available visas, then that individual will have to wait until his or her visa number becomes 
available. For individuals from oversubscribed countries—meaning the number of total 
requested visas for that country exceeds the 7 percent per-country limit—the wait to 
immigrate can be even longer.  
Each month, the Department of State publishes a visa bulletin showing the priority 
dates that are being processed. Table 3 and Table 4 show the priority dates as of September 
2019. The intended immigrants with priority dates earlier than the date listed have an 
available visa to immigrate or adjust their status as an LPR. 
                                                 
153 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Immigrant Numbers for September 2019.” 
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Table 3. Family-Sponsored Preference Priority Dates164 
Preference Category  All Other 
Countries 
China India Mexico Philippines  
1st—Unmarried sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 01/01/13 01/01/13 01/01/13 08/01/96 06/22/08 
2nd—Spouses and children of LPRs Current Current Current Current Current 
2nd—Unmarried sons/daughters of LPRs 06/01/14 06/01/14 06/01/14 07/01/98 08/01/08 
3rd—Married sons/daughters of U.S. citizens 09/01/07 09/01/07 09/01/07 12/01/95 02/01/98 
4th—Siblings of U.S. citizens 11/01/06 11/01/06 09/22/04 01/01/97 07/01/98 
LPR = lawful permanent resident 
  
                                                 
164 Adapted from U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs. 
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Table 4. Employment-Based Preference Priority Dates165 






India Mexico Philippines  Vietnam 
1st—Priority workers 10/01/17 01/01/14 10/01/17 U 10/01/17 10/01/17 10/01/17 
2nd —Advanced degrees 01/01/18 01/01/17 01/01/18 05/08/09 01/01/18 01/01/18 01/01/18 
3rd—Skilled workers 07/01/16 01/01/14 07/01/16 07/01/05 07/01/16 07/01/16 07/01/16 
3rd—Other workers 07/01/16 11/22/07 07/01/16 07/01/05 07/01/16 07/01/16 07/01/16 
4th—Special immigrants U U 11/01/06 U U U U 
4th—Religious workers U  U U U U U U 
5th—Investors Current  10/22/14 Current  09/01/17 Current 10/22/14 10/22/14 
U = visa numbers unavailable  
 
                                                 
165 Adapted from U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs. 
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The length of the immigration queue for preference category immigrants can range 
from no wait to over twenty years. Based on the tables above, a Mexican national who 
qualifies as a married son or daughter of a U.S. citizen would need a petition filed on his 
behalf almost twenty-four years ago to immigrate. By contrast, a Chinese priority worker 
would have had to file his petition five years ago to have an available visa. According to a 
Department of State report, as of November 1, 2018, 3.7 million immigrant applicants are 
waiting for an available visa.166 The majority of those immigrants (3.67 million) are part 
of one of the family-sponsored preference categories.167 These figures do not account for 
any petitions with USCIS awaiting adjustment of status or adjudication. The numerical 
limits and per-country caps established in 1990 contribute to excessive waiting periods for 
immigrants seeking to reunite with their family or work in the United States.  
C. COMPLICATIONS IN THE PROCESS  
The primary purpose of this section is to provide additional context to help explain 
why the immigration system has been unable to meet its goals.  
1. The Problems with the Immigration Apparatus 
The United States’ immigration system fails to meet its desired objectives of 
reuniting families and allowing enough skilled workers to immigrate. The majority of 
prospective immigrants are eligible under family-based or employment-based immigrant 
categories.168 Unsurprisingly, the immigration policies currently in place have generated 
a demand that far exceeds the number of available immigrant visas.169 As previously 
discussed, the Department of State determined that 3.67 million eligible individuals are on 
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the waiting list in family-sponsored preference categories.170 This figure does not account 
for those waiting in other immigrant categories, or additional processing backlogs found 
with USCIS.171 While family reunification has been a guiding principle in U.S. 
immigration policies, it has created an imbalance within the immigration system. Family 
reunification policies have contributed to an immigration multiplier, or “the number of 
future immigrants who come to the United States as a result of the admission of one current 
immigrant.”172 Accordingly, eligible family members seeking to be reunited outpace visa 
availability, resulting in an overburdened immigration system that is unable to meet the 
demand.  
Inflexible per-country ceilings and numerical limitations that have remain 
unchanged for thirty years also contribute to the backlogs.173 As discussed, immediate 
relatives (spouses, children, and parents of U.S. citizens) are not subject to numerical 
limitations. This lowers the available visa quotas for other sponsored family members.174 
Also, per-country ceilings, created to stop countries from dominating other countries’ 
admissions, have resulted in additional delays for individuals from India, China, Mexico, 
and the Philippines.175 Hence, an individual from a family-sponsored preference category 
can wait anywhere between five to twenty-four years for a visa, depending on the country 
they are from and the preference category. The Migration Policy Institute has argued that 
long wait times result in excessive family separation, and that the United States loses out 
on years that the individual could be contributing to the U.S. economy.176 Furthermore, 
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long wait times for intended family-based immigrants also serve as a conduit for illegal 
immigration.177 So, while immigration policies were meant to benefit the country, the 
system is unable to reunite families and fulfil its economic objectives.  
2. The Actuality in Employment-Based Numbers 
The 1990 Act was driven by legislators who recognized the importance of bringing 
skilled labor into the United States, which resulted in an increase of employment-based 
visa allocations from 54,000 to 140,000.178 However, of the 140,000 allocated visas, more 
than 20,000 went to foreign nationals that do not have specific skills.179 Another 
significant portion is used by family members of employment-based immigrants. In fiscal 
year 2017, a total of 137,855 employment-based immigrants obtained LPR status.180 
While it appears that the United States was close to meeting its annual goal of admitting 
140,000 skilled workers, the number does not accurately reflect employment-specific 
immigrants. For instance, the fourth and fifth categories took up 14 percent (19,381) of the 
total employment-based green card allocations.181  
Because family unity is a governing policy in the U.S. immigration system, family 
reunification benefits extend to the employment-based categories. Hence, spouses and 
children of employment-based immigrants can also obtain LPR status, taking one of the 
140,000 available slots.182 Of the 41,060 priority workers (first preference) in 2017 who 
obtained a green card, 24,117, or 59 percent, went to spouses and children.183 For 
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individuals holding advanced degrees or foreign nationals of exceptional ability (second 
preference), of the 39,331 green cards, 19,899, or just over 50 percent, went to family 
members.184 Lastly, for the skilled workers, professionals, and other workers (third 
preference), of the 38,083 granted green cards, 19,482, or 51 percent, went to spouses and 
children.185 Thus, the number of immigrants granted LPR status due to their skills or 
education was much lower than the 137,855 projects.  
3. Insufficiencies in Employment-Based Categories 
The majority of the employment-based immigrants that obtained LPR status in 
fiscal year 2017 did so through the first, second, and third preference categories. Most had 
employer sponsors, but some had to show evidence that they would be working in their 
respective fields of expertise. Thus, most qualified individuals in the employment-based 
categories have job offers contingent on their pending LPR status. Approval of an 
employment-based petition happens whether or not there will be a visa number available 
for that individual.186 The Congressional Research Service reports that the number of 
prospective employment-based immigrants awaiting visas despite an approved petition 
was more than 900,000 in mid-2018.187 The combination of numerical limits and per-
country caps leads to significant delays for employers who are seeking to bring labor into, 
or keep labor in, the United States.  
In addition to numerical limitations, per-country caps have made it challenging for 
foreign nationals from high-demand countries to obtain LPR status.188 The per-country 
cap of 7 percent exists irrespective of the size and population of the country. So a country 
like India, which has an estimated population of 1.2 billion, will quickly surpass the per-
                                                 
184 Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics, 21. 
185 Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics, 22. 
186 Kandel, Permanent Employment-Based Immigration, 11. 
187 Kandel. 
188 Stuart Anderson, Waiting and More Waiting: America’s Family and Employment-Based 
Immigration System (Arlington, VA: National Foundation for American Policy, 2011), 2–3, 
http://www.nfap.com/pdf/WAITING_NFAP_Policy_Brief_October_2011.pdf. 
48 
country limit compared to a smaller country.189 The National Foundation for American 
Policy states that, due to the combination of numerical limitations and per-country caps, an 
Indian worker seeking to qualify in the third preference can expect to wait ten to twenty-
five years or longer.190 As previously stated, a priority date places a prospective immigrant 
worker in line. That place in line fluctuates based on the number of approved petitions 
ahead of the individual, family members that use reserved slots first, and the individual’s 
country of origin. The per-country cap does not account for the fact that individuals from 
in-demand countries, like India or China, have needed skills or will help fulfill gaps in the 
U.S. workforce.191  
The 1990 Act failed to account for technological advances that would demand more 
skilled labor.192 Since the 1990 legislation, no additional expansions have been made to 
account for the number of individuals who could immigrate based on their skills, despite 
emerging needs in today’s workforce and changes in the labor market. An aging 
demographic, low birth rates, and technological advances are factors that affect labor 
shortages the United States.193 According to the Committee for Economic Development, 
since 2000, the United States has experienced a loss of 5 million jobs from commonly in-
demand, blue-collar occupations.194 However, the U.S. labor market has seen a significant 
need for health care workers, skilled trades (i.e., machinists, electricians) and STEM 
(science, technology, engineering, and math) occupations.195 Those labor-shortage gaps 
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are often filled by employment-based immigrants in the second and third preference 
categories, which experience the most backlogs.196  
Another issue surrounding the employment-based categories is the complexity 
within the sponsorship process. Employers who seek to bring foreign nationals for 
employment purposes must go through additional layers of approval that are not required 
for family-based immigrants. Prospective immigrants seeking to come to the United States 
for employment purposes must go through rigid procedures with three agencies (USCIS, 
DOL, and the Department of State), with different requirements at each phase.197 The 
employer must show that the individual meets the qualifications for the work, and, for the 
second and third preference categories, must go through the labor certification process. The 
labor certification process is often cumbersome, costly, and lengthy.198 As such, getting a 
labor certification can be a deterrent for prospective employers. Furthermore, individuals 
seeking to bring their skills without a sponsor must meet stringent standards, making it 
challenging for them to immigrant on their own. 
4. A Temporary Fix for Highly Skilled Workers  
The United States’ current immigration system allows foreign nationals to work, 
study, or visit temporarily. During fiscal year 2017, 82 percent of employment-based 
immigrants obtained a green card “adjusted status,” meaning they were already in the 
United States.199 Many of the highly skilled immigrant workers in the second and third 
categories are awaiting LPR status in the United States on temporary work visas (H-1B or 
L-1A).200 The Migration Policy Institute reports that U.S. employers are using the 
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temporary work visas to circumvent the long wait times and inflexible regulations for 
permanent residency.201 The demand for temporary visas is high, especially for the H-1B 
category. For instance, every year, USCIS allocates 65,000 H-1B visas for individuals with 
a bachelor’s degree and 20,000 for individuals with a master’s degree or higher.202 For 
fiscal year 2020, the H-1B petition process opened on April 1, 2019; by April 5, USCIS 
had met the H-1B cap.203 Like the demand for green cards, demand for temporary work 
visas in the United States outpaces the available supply.  
The demand for temporary visas is significant, and it is a reflection of how U.S. 
employers are using temporary work visa programs to meet labor demands. Temporary 
work visas are supposed to help with short-term labor demands; however, due to available 
extensions, someone on an H-1B can be in temporary status for several years, especially if 
they are waiting for their LPR status. The Cato Institute reports that employer reliance on 
temporary visas exacerbates the backlogs for the employment-based categories, as the 
temporary visa holders can wait in the United States while they work.204 This places the 
immigrant worker in temporary status for years, not allowing them to seek other 
employment opportunities or establish permanent roots in the United States. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The immigration process described in this chapter illustrates an apparatus created 
to meet U.S. policy objectives: reunite families and increase the pool of skilled workers. 
However, the system was created by policies that lacked the flexibility or ingenuity to 
change as the country changed. The current system has created excess wait times, has kept 
families apart, and has led to temporary solutions to bring immigrant workers to the United 
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States.205 For almost thirty years, the country has been unable to make changes to the 
immigration system; all the while, the need to reform has dominated the national discourse. 
The issue remains: What system is best suited to meet the needs of the country? More so, 
what type of immigrant—family-based or employment-based—is better suited to meet the 
needs of the country? Recent proposals have called for a merit-based system, which would 
enable the country to bring in the “best and brightest” immigrants. Further examination of 
a merit-based system that is already in place, such as the one in Canada, can help 
policymakers determine if such a system would be best for the United States.  
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IV. COMPARING THE UNITED STATES’ FAMILY-BASED 
SYSTEM AND CANADA’S POINTS-BASED SYSTEM 
The United States and Canada have had similar social, economic, and political 
considerations shape their respective immigration policies. In their formative years of 
development and economic growth, both countries supported greater immigration. 
Eventually, due to high levels of immigration, the countries changed their policies in an 
attempt to curtail immigration, which raised questions about what type of immigrant would 
be best for the country. Confronted with a need for a system that would manage legal 
immigration and serve national interests, the countries developed divergent practices. 
Canada was one of the first countries to implement a points-based system (also 
referred to as a merit-based system) as an economic tool to bring skilled workers into the 
country and address demographic challenges. Such a system lists the desirable traits (e.g., 
education, language, experience) sought from prospective immigrants. By prioritizing its 
economic interests, Canada developed an immigration system that allowed for 60 percent 
of its immigrant population to be highly educated.206 The United States, on the other hand, 
implemented a system that primarily prioritized the admission of family-based immigrants 
and has functioned on the same principle of family reunification for over fifty years; the 
U.S. system also admits some educated people but not as many as the Canadian system.  
Countries that seek to compete economically on the global stage benefit from 
immigration policies that support a skilled immigrant workforce.207 As U.S. policymakers 
debate reforms to the immigration system, the Trump administration has looked to 
Canada’s points-based system, which has successfully brought highly skilled workers into 
the country.208 Trump has argued that the United States would similarly benefit from a 
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points-based system, though he maintains that family-based immigration, which he refers 
to as chain migration, is detrimental to the country’s competitiveness.209 Family-based 
immigration has been framed in a negative light by those who seek to limit immigrant 
admission numbers. However, as this chapter demonstrates, family-based immigration is 
more complex than it is commonly made out to be. The threshold for admission may be an 
immigrant’s relationship to a U.S. relative; however, family-based immigrants have varied 
skills that are needed for a competitive economy.210 The question then emerges: What 
should U.S. reform address and what can we learn from the Canadian system? This chapter 
also reviews how Canada defines its national interests and how the Canadian immigration 
system furthers those interests, and summarizes how Canada’s well-managed immigration 
system is a result of legislation that allowed for flexibility and continuous assessment. 
A. IS FAMILY-BASED IMMIGRATION HURTING THE UNITED STATES?  
As mentioned, the U.S. and Canadian immigration systems prioritize the admission 
of immigrants differently. Canada primarily admits immigrants based on their education 
and skills, while the United States mostly admits individuals based on their family ties. The 
Trump administration has candidly disagreed with a system that “favors random chance 
over the skills our economy needs.”211 In May 2019, the administration announced a 
proposal to implement an immigration system that values merit over familial ties, with a 
57 percent increase in skills-based immigration.212  
At the heart of the argument is that family-based immigration contributes to low-
skilled immigrants, which affects employment levels, native-born workers’ wages, and 
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social services.213 The Trump administration is not alone in its views; organizations like 
the Center for Immigration Studies call for an end to chain migration, arguing that a merit-
based system would supply immigrants who are better suited for the United States and its 
economy.214 Thus, shifting to a points-based system would allow the United States to have 
control over what type of immigrant is granted admission, with the highly skilled and 
educated being the most preferred.215 To select an immigration system most applicable to 
the United States’ economic needs, we must first understand what the current family-based 
immigration system does for the United States.  
1. Are There Too Many Family-Based Immigrants? 
Once seen as impartial and scholarly, the term chain migration was used by 
researchers in 1964 to describe the migratory patterns of southern Italians to the United 
States.216 It was described as the immigration process that enabled new immigrants to 
resettle “by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants.”217 In today’s 
discourse on immigration, it is perceived as a negative phrase to describe the family 
reunification policies of the U.S. immigration system. Critics of the current immigration 
system see a process that has allowed family members to be the decision-makers in who 
gets to come to the United States.218 The Trump administration uses the term to describe 
an unsatisfactory immigration process that allows the admission of low-skilled 
immigrants.219 This process, the president states, has allowed the United States to 
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“discriminate against genius.”220 Therefore, the argument is that the current immigration 
system, which prioritizes family-based immigrants, neglects other U.S. interests like job 
creation, economic growth, and innovation.  
A closer look shows that the facts surrounding chain migration are more complex 
than commonly understood. There is a supposition that the family-based immigration 
system allows one immigrant to sponsor many more new immigrants, who may or may not 
fit American needs. Trump claims that the system has led to an “unlimited number of 
distant relatives.”221 However, the U.S. immigration system has not permitted an 
“automatic process” that allows limitless family members to immigrate.222 While family-
based immigrants do make up a large share of the total annual immigrant admissions, the 
system does place limits on admission numbers. Immigration statutes prevent family-based 
immigrants from saturating the U.S. immigration system. As described in the previous 
chapter, current U.S. immigration regulations control who is allowed to be a sponsor and 
who the sponsor can bring in, and limits the number allowed annually. Further, the 
sponsorship of a family member is a lengthy process that involves multiple steps and 
screenings. The discourse surrounding family-based immigration creates the perception of 
an unrestricted immigration system, but established numerical limitations counter that 
argument.  
Between 2008 and 2017, such factors have limited growth in immigration levels 
based on family migration.223 The numerical limitations and per-country caps have kept 
family-based immigration levels approximately the same and have prevented automatic 
processing, as many of the qualified relatives get held up in visa queues and extensive 
backlogs. In 2010, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Ombudsman 
estimated that an unmarried Mexican son or daughter of a U.S. citizen could wait nineteen 
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years to complete the immigration process (obtain a green card).224 Once that individual 
immigrates, the sponsorship of additional family members would then involve new 
processing times. Additionally, other secondary factors, like changes in marital status, can 
change prospective immigrants’ wait times, sometimes even voiding their eligibility.225 
The wait times and restrictions illustrate that the current family reunification policy does 
not facilitate an automatic or limitless supply of family-based immigrants. Thus, a 
significant portion of political rhetoric surrounding the phrase chain migration is 
misleading.  
2. The Impact of Family-Based Immigration on the United States 
Bringing individuals to the United States from a broad spectrum of backgrounds is 
essential for the nation’s economy.226 Family-based immigrants are perceived to be 
unskilled and have low education levels. However, such perceptions are problematic 
because they provide only a skewed perspective of the nation’s needs. This perspective 
also dismisses the facts, which illustrate that the family-based immigration brings in a 
significant number of educated workers. While family-based immigrants are not required 
to have any education, employment-based skills, or English proficiency, data shows that 
family-based immigrants are increasingly better educated. The Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) reports that 37 percent of new immigrants to the 
United States have advanced degrees, which is higher than in other OECD countries and 
the European Union.227 In 2015, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that fewer immigrants 
hold high school diplomas than do native-born citizens, but 13 percent of immigrants have 
graduate degrees while only 12 percent of the U.S.-born population holds a graduate 
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degree.228 Also, the OECD found that new immigrants account for 21 percent of the highly 
skilled labor force in the United States, and 22 percent are working in science, engineering, 
and other specialized fields.229  
Between fiscal years 2008 and 2017, family-based immigrants represented over 60 
percent of total immigrant admissions into the United States.230 Accordingly, the increase 
of newly educated immigrants corresponds to the admission of family-based immigrants. 
Additionally, an expert from the Cato Institute reported that the United States is 
experiencing an increase of new immigrant arrivals with higher levels of education, which 
may result in an immigrant population that closely resembles the population of a merit-
based system.231 As stated previously, the U.S. immigration system has not been reformed 
in decades, and has continued to prioritize family unity over other immigration categories. 
Thus, family-based immigrants are bringing with them favorable traits to the United States, 
irrespective of a formal system that assesses their skills.  
While family-based immigrants do not need to have certain skills to be admitted 
into the country, they nonetheless bring with them skills that make them adaptable for the 
U.S. labor market. According to the National Foundation for American Policy, because 
family-based immigrants are not admitted to the United States based on any specific skills, 
they are more open to learning and acquiring needed skills as the labor market changes.232 
Family-based immigrants’ adaptability is a result of their investment in their education and 
training, their readiness to change occupations, and their willingness to move for 
employment opportunities.233 Also, established social, family, and community ties in the 
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United States influence immigrants’ productivity and upward mobility.234 Social 
integration is an important factor in one’s ability to participate in the economy. Family-
based immigrants have established networks that help them find jobs, housing, and 
childcare—all essential factors in how quickly an immigrant can enter the labor market. 
Another issue with family-based immigration is the notion that unskilled 
immigrants affect the wages of U.S.-born workers. The idea surrounds the basic economic 
theory of supply, which states that more low-skilled immigrants will increase the supply 
of labor, therefore decreasing wages and employment opportunities for native U.S. 
workers.235 However, low-skilled immigration has not been found to negatively affect the 
wages or employment opportunities of U.S.-born workers.236 More so, immigrant 
participation in the workforce is found to increase the income of native-born workers.237 
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine have also found that 
immigrants, in general, increase the need for consumer goods, which increases the 
country’s productivity, lowers the prices of goods, and increases the need for additional 
labor.238 Thus, immigration, both low-skilled and high-skilled, helps boost the U.S. 
economy. 
Family-based immigrants help supply needed labor, which is an important 
requirement that immigration policies seek to address. The United States is experiencing 
demographic challenges due to an aging workforce and low birthrates.239 For instance, the 
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that in 2018, U.S. birthrates were at 
their lowest in thirty-two years.240 A report from the U.S. Census reveals that by 2030, 
there will be more adults over the age of sixty-five than there will be children.241 Of 
consequence, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that jobs for home care assistance, 
construction, and hospitality will experience the most growth between 2018 and 2028.242 
Our aging population is contributing to a need for more home aides, health care workers, 
and elder care workers, creating labor gaps in growing industries.243 These are job sectors 
that are often filled by family-based immigrants.244 Lower-skilled immigrants are also able 
to fill needed labor shortages in the United States for more labor-intensive occupations, 
like construction.245 While not admitted for their skills or education levels, family-based 
immigrants are important for the “essential economy—which encompasses the food 
services and hospitality industries, construction, agriculture, elder care, and 
manufacturing.”246 Therefore, family-based immigrants are essential for an advanced U.S. 
economy, which requires a broad range of both unskilled and skilled labor.  
B. CANADA: INTRODUCING A POINTS-BASED IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
Like its American counterpart, the Canadian immigration system initially 
implemented restrictive policies based on race and nationality. The Canadian Immigration 
Act of 1910 allowed the government to control admission numbers, limiting immigration 
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to individuals from preferred countries of origin.247 Thus, much like the United States, 
Canada’s former immigration laws focused on protecting the racial-ethnic makeup of the 
country, heavily limiting immigration from non-European countries.  
During the 1960s, Canada embraced more liberal immigration policies as the 
country focused on nation-building.248 The Immigration Reform Act of 1967 eliminated 
restrictions based on race and nationality, creating an immigration system that would 
consider immigrants based on merit instead.249 To this end, the changes in 1967 introduced 
a new selection mechanism: the points-based system. The new system ensured 
impartiality—when it comes to race and ethnicity—in the evaluation process for potential 
immigrants.250  
Canada’s points-based system was created to evaluate an intending immigrant’s 
suitability for the country. The system would “define the various factors affecting a 
person’s ability to settle successfully in Canada and attach relative weights to them.”251 
Initially, the points system ranked potential immigrants in nine categories, which included 
education, occupation demand, occupation skill level, age, prearranged job offer, language, 
and other factors.252 Unlike the United States’ family-based system, the Canadian points-
based system focused on labor market demands, emphasizing a need for immigrants that 
would bring in desired skills and fill occupation gaps in Canada’s economy. 
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Canada’s adoption of a points-based system was the result of policymakers’ desire 
to use the immigration system to further economic objectives.253 If the labor market 
changed, the points-based system could be adjusted to respond to those market changes.254 
Adjusting the points-based system in response to market fluctuations was beneficial for 
businesses seeking to fill vacancies and acquire individuals with specific skills. 
Consequently, Canada could fulfill short-term economic needs and increase its pool of 
skilled immigrants.255 Furthermore, the points-based system allowed Canada to shift 
priorities in their immigration policy as country conditions changed.256  
1. Defining National Interest in Canadian Immigration Policy  
The Immigration Act of 1976 opened Canada’s doors to the rest of the world.257 
The act created the three primary streams of immigration-related interests for the country—
economic, family unity, and humanitarian—and eliminated discriminatory practices.258 Of 
significance, a provision in the act made it a requirement for the minister of the then 
Department of Manpower and Immigration to report to Parliament an annual projection of 
immigrant admission numbers.259 The report details how Canada’s demographic needs are 
met through its immigration system.260 Presently, the report is completed by the minister 
of immigration, refugees, and citizenship.261 The Immigration Act of 1976 was a 
                                                 
253 Green and Green, 120. 
254 Harold Troper, “Canada’s Immigration Policy Since 1945,” International Journal 48, no. 2 
(1993): 271, https://doi.org/10.2307/40202881. 
255 Green and Green, “The Goals of Canada’s Immigration Policy,” 120–26. 
256 Troper, “Canada’s Immigration Policy Since 1945,” 271. 
257 A. E. Challinor, “Canada’s Immigration Policy: A Focus on Human Capital,” Migration Policy 
Institute, September 15, 2011, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/canadas-immigration-policy-focus-
human-capital. 
258 Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates, 209; Challinor, “Canada’s Immigration Policy.” 
259 Knowles, Strangers at Our Gates, 208–9. 
260 Knowles, 208–9. 




significant piece of legislation for Canada, emphasizing the importance of specific 
objectives and priorities in the country’s immigration legislation.  
The Immigration Act of 1976 was viewed as a forward-looking piece of legislation 
that provided significant benchmarks for the Canadian immigration system that is in place 
today. However, economies and the migration of people are continually evolving matters; 
accordingly, the Canadian immigration system went through several changes after 
1976.262 Economic interests led to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001, 
which outlines the latest objectives and applications of the Canadian immigration system, 
with the following being the most significant: 
• to permit Canada to pursue the maximum social, cultural and economic 
benefits of immigration;… 
• to support and assist the development of minority official languages 
communities in Canada; 
• to see that families are reunited in Canada; 
• to support, by means of consistent standards and prompt processing, the 
attainment of immigration goals … in consultation with the provinces;… 
• to fulfil Canada’s international legal obligations with respect to refugees 
and affirm Canada’s commitment to international efforts to provide 
assistance to those in need of resettlement;… 
• to further the domestic and international interests of Canada.263 
Successive Canadian governments of different political persuasions have 
determined that it is in Canada’s national interest to continuously economically develop 
different regions of the country, and they have used immigration policy to do so. The 
specific expectations within the Canadian immigration policy prevent ambiguity about 
national interests. The legislation directly outlines the goals and functions of the country’s 
immigration system and what it seeks to achieve from the system.  
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2. Understanding Canada’s Points-Based System  
Permanent residency in Canada can also be achieved through family sponsorship, 
economic immigration, or through a humanitarian program.264 In 2017, Canada admitted 
286,479 permanent residents from three categories: the economic class, the family class, 
and the refugee class.265 The economic class accounted for 55.6 percent of total immigrant 
admissions, with 159,262 permanent residents admitted.266 The family class only 
accounted for 28.79 percent, and refugees made up 15.62 percent of total admissions.267 
Contrary to popular belief, Canada’s immigration system allows individuals to 
immigrate based on their relationship with a Canadian citizen outside of the points-based 
system. Canada supports the reunification of spouses, domestic partners, unmarried 
children under the age of twenty-two, parents, and grandparents.268 Other relatives (such 
as siblings and grandchildren) may also be eligible for sponsorship in limited 
circumstances.269 Also, in furtherance of family unity, Canada has a “super visa” that 
allows Canadians to sponsor their parents or grandparents for a temporary stay.270 Thus, 
while Canada prioritizes its economic class, family-based immigration is also a pathway; 
much like in the United States, family-based immigrants to Canada are not required to have 
skills or education.  
The economic class is a comprehensive classification within Canada’s immigration 
system. It is the only immigration stream that encompasses a points system for some of its 
immigrant categories. The economic class includes skilled workers, provincial nominees, 
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the Atlantic Immigration Pilot, business immigrants, caregivers, or Quebec-selected skilled 
workers.271 Canada’s economic programs are all-encompassing, meaning that the 
Canadian government consults and works with all of its provinces to develop immigration 
pathways that meet regional needs. For instance, the Atlantic Immigration Pilot was 
developed as a recruitment effort to help the four Atlantic provinces (New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador) bring in students 
and skilled workers.272 Quebec has its own economic immigration program that supports 
economic migration.273  
The Canadian points-based system has undergone several modifications since its 
introduction in 1967. The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001 changed the 
points system by applying a human capital approach; this approach differed from the 
previous system because it largely evaluated an individual’s skill set based on occupation 
demand.274 The current human capital approach measures an immigrant’s potential 
success and economic contribution to the country based on a range of attributes.275 It is 
also a way of selecting individuals who can adapt as the labor market fluctuates—that is, 
people who already possess a variety of skills that will allow them to participate in 
Canadian society and the workforce, irrespective of a job offer.276  
Since 2015, Canada has used a new system known as Express Entry to manage 
three of its economic immigration programs.277 Prospective immigrants seeking to apply 
under Express Entry undergo a two-step process that involves two sets of point allocations. 
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Canada’s points-based system is also often associated with the Federal Skilled Worker 
Program: those who wish to immigrate to Canada based on their foreign work experience 
or education can do so through this program, which is the first step for interested 
candidates.278 To meet the basic eligibility and work experience requirements, the 
individual must: 
• Have at least one year of continuous paid work experience in the last ten 
years in one of the National Occupational Classification (NOC) job 
groups: managerial occupations, professional occupations, or technical 
occupations and skilled trades279  
• Receive a minimum score of Canadian Language Benchmark level 7 in 
writing, reading, listening, and speaking in English or French 
• Possess at least a secondary education280  
If a prospective immigrant meets these minimum requirements, his or her application will 
be evaluated on six selection factors that are part of a 100-point grid.281 The individual 
needs to score at least 67 points to qualify for the Federal Skilled Worker Program.282 
Individuals with 67 points and above would then go through the 1,200-point 
Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS), which ranks all candidates that apply through 
Express Entry against each other, and is the final step in the points process.283 The two-
step process has allowed for efficiency in the processing of applications, eliminating those 
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who are not qualified and preventing backlogs.284 The six selection criteria and the 
maximum number of points for the Federal Skilled Worker Program are as follows: 
• Language (maximum 28 points): must show the ability to communicate in 
English or French through a language test. Points are given based on test 
scores received in speaking, listening, reading, and writing. 
• Education (maximum 25 points): the individual must show a completed 
certificate, diploma, or degree from a Canadian high school or post-
secondary school. For those with foreign education, the individual must 
show that the received degree is equivalent to a degree in Canada. 
• Work experience (maximum 15 points): individuals receive points based 
on the number of years spent working full-time in one of the skill types 
listed in the NOC. The work experience can be in Canada or abroad. 
• Age (maximum 12 points): individuals earn points based on their age at 
the time of application. Those between the age of eighteen and thirty-five 
can obtain the maximum points; those aged forty-seven and older receive 
0 points. 
• Employment (maximum 10 points): individuals get points with 
prearranged job offers from a Canadian employer. The job offer must 
reflect the skill types listed in the NOC, and the offer must be for at least 
one year. 
• Adaptability (maximum 10 points): the individual and his or her respective 
spouse or common-law partner can earn points based on a combination of 
factors, including language levels, past studies in Canada, past work 
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experience in Canada, offered employment in Canada, and relatives in 
Canada.285 
Since its implementation, Canada’s points-based system has gone through several 
modifications due to legislation that requires constant evaluation. Those constant 
modifications have led to a considerably successful immigration system, with 60 percent 
of the country’s immigrant population deemed to be the most educated compared to other 
countries.286 The OECD reports that the selection mechanism in place has resulted in better 
rates of labor market participation for Canada’s immigrant population and has supported 
Canada’s population growth.287 Based on the previous criteria, the current points-based 
system helps bring in a more youthful population that is educated and fluent in one or both 
of the country’s official languages. 
However, the country has faced some challenges in assigning appropriate points for 
the attributes listed earlier to address shifts in evolving economic and demographic 
numbers. For instance, having a prearranged job offer has been a point of constant debate 
in the Canadian immigration system. Before 2008, the weight given to prospective 
immigrants with prearranged job offers and language proficiency was minimal, which led 
to an increase of applications in the Federal Skilled Worker Program, creating significant 
backlogs.288 Also, it led to many highly educated immigrants who were unable to find 
employment that could meet their qualifications.289 Accordingly, a shift was made to limit 
the Federal Skilled Worker Program to favor those with prearranged job offers, to require 
certain language proficiency levels, and to limit the applications the government would 
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process.290 More recent reforms have shifted back to assigning minimal points for those 
with job offers while increasing the points for those with Canadian degrees.291 
Another point of contention has been the occupation list (NOC), which limits 
applications from individuals who have relevant job experience outside of the NOC job 
groups.292 Some do not believe the NOC can effectively predict what jobs will be of 
demand due to changing labor markets.293 The human capital approach has played a 
significant role in Canada’s immigration system, shaping the population of immigrants 
flowing into the country. Still, for some, the notion of adding economic value to an 
immigrant weakens an immigration system (and country) often seen as liberal and 
compassionate.294  
Unlike in the United States, where there is always a political demand and there is 
always debate for immigration reform, Canada’s points-based system does not draw much 
attention. Canada functions on the notion that immigrants are added value to the economy 
and overall progress of the country.295 The Canadian-born population sees immigration as 
beneficial to the economy since the majority of admitted immigrants go through the points-
based system.296 However, skill-based immigrant admissions in Canada, much like in the 
United States, include the family members of admitted immigrants.297 When looking at 
Canada’s admission numbers, we must therefore consider that not all of those admissions 
are skill-based immigrants. Hence, Canada, much like the United States, has valued family 
relationships equally. 
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C. SHOULD WE LOOK TO CANADA AS A MODEL? 
Canada has implemented a well-managed immigration system, one that has resulted 
in high admission rates for skilled immigrants, which is attractive for countries that are 
seeking to compete on the global economic stage. The OECD has called Canada’s 
immigration system “the largest and most comprehensive and elaborate skilled labor 
migration system in the OECD.”298 The value of the Canadian system lies in its ability to 
adapt to the evolving economy. Canada has been able to prioritize the economic class in 
its policy, managing the admission of mostly skilled and highly educated immigrants into 
the country, which has yielded positive results.  
Canada has used its immigration system to grow its economy, support demographic 
changes, and manage the flow of people into the country—all of which have contributed 
to the country’s positive reception toward its immigrant population, which is seen as vital 
to the economy.299 Immigration is used to meet population deficits as the country’s 
population ages and experiences declining birth rates.300 Also, immigration fills gaps in 
the labor market and brings workers to specific Canadian provinces and territories.301 
Participation in the country’s labor market has resulted in immigrants who are better 
integrated into Canadian society. Additionally, 85 percent of immigrants report income 
from their jobs within their first year as citizens.302  
Canada’s success is due to the government’s constant modification of its 
immigration system. Canada’s points-based system has undergone several changes due to 
effective planning, monitoring, and review from the government. The ongoing review of 
the immigration system has allowed the government to plan for labor market changes and 
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priority changes, and assess potential deficiencies in the system.303 For example, before 
the Express Entry system was introduced in 2015, the country experienced a surge of 
applications; the government was unable to process the applications quickly, fill 
occupations gaps, or meet employer demands.304 The backlog prevented the country from 
meeting its objective of welcoming immigrants who could participate in the labor market. 
The current two-step process allows Canada to eliminate certain applications in the first 
step. The second step, the CRS system, has worked to adjust the overall points of qualified 
applicants based on labor market needs.305  
Although Canada’s immigration system has experienced positive outcomes, it has 
also come with challenges. The system is mostly supply-driven in that individuals can 
immigrate without preexisting ties to the country. Accordingly, employers are unable to 
influence the type of immigrant worker that is admitted through the points system, meaning 
that labor demands are not always met.306 With Canada’s human capital approach, 
individuals are assumed to have transferable skills that make them adaptable to labor 
market fluctuations, not binding them to a specific job.307 
While Canada has a high rate of employment among its immigrants, newly arrived 
immigrants without preexisting job offers have a difficult time entering the job market 
compared to the native-born population.308 Highly educated immigrants without a prior 
job offer have to spend time obtaining the appropriate Canadian credentials, which means 
they must dedicate their resources into upgrading their qualifications.309 Highly educated 
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immigrants are therefore often unemployed or underemployed, devaluing their foreign job 
experience.310 The lack of value in foreign experience contributes to “brain waste” (unused 
capital) in the country.311 Immigrants are unable to benefit from their skills, which is a 
loss for the host country and society at large.While Canada’s system has prioritized the 
skilled and educated, the points system also rewards individuals who have preexisting 
connections to the country, like family members, which is often not noted in comparative 
analysis. Thus, Canada’s system also recognizes the importance of social ties to an 
immigrant’s success in the country. In addition to a flexible government that has been 
responsive to challenges in the immigration system, Canada’s immigration system has been 
effective thanks to the integration services the country provides.312 While economic 
immigrants may not all have job offers, the country has set up a platform known as Job 
Bank that allows immigrants to search for jobs based on their skills and that allows 
employers to recruit for those skills based on their job openings.313 The country also has 
pre-arrival programs that help immigrants get appropriate licenses and foreign credentials 
accepted by employers, and that provide language services, among other resettlement 
services.314 In summary, Canada’s immigration system has taken a holistic approach to 
address how immigrants are selected and integrated into the larger society. 
D. CONCLUSION  
While delivering remarks on necessary modernization to the U.S. immigration 
system, President Trump used Canada’s points system as an aspirational example.315 As 
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the United States debates reforming its immigration system based on its national interests, 
Canada’s system can provide valuable lessons; however, the primary lesson lies in the 
system’s flexibility rather than in its ability to supply skilled labor. Besides admitting 
immigrants that are educated and socially integrated, Canada’s points-based system 
promotes transparency and efficiency, and addresses the country’s current economic and 
demographic needs.316 Additionally, the Canadian system provides the government with 
the opportunity to control the narrative of a managed immigration system that admits the 
“best and brightest” immigrants.317  
Does the United States need to increase the number of immigrants with advanced 
degrees and fill labor gaps that require a certain knowledge base? Should the immigration 
policies serve more than a knowledge-based economy? The American economy is not 
stagnant; like Canada’s economy, the U.S. economy has changing needs. Canada’s 
immigration system has been successful largely thanks to legislation that requires an annual 
administrative review of the system. This means the system that is continually assessed for 
effectiveness. In comparison, the United States’ immigration policies cannot be 
administratively changed easily; they require policy development through legislative 
action. Politically, this has been far from easy; there has been no significant immigration 
reform since 1990.  
Much like the United States, family reunification policies also play a role in 
Canada’s immigration system. Family-based immigration has been a point of contention 
for those who seek to limit U.S. immigration levels and focus on admitted more skilled-
based immigrants. As this thesis has demonstrated, however, there is merit in the 
established networks and wide range of skills that family-based immigrants bring to the 
United States. Proposals that gloss over the current functions of the immigration system 
dismiss the true reasons why the current system does not fulfill national interests. However, 
the Canadian model does not dismiss this fact at all; the annual reviews allows the system 
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to adapt to the needs of the time. The value of the Canadian model is in its flexibility and 
reform mechanisms.  
75 
V. CONCLUSION 
[Immigration] reminded every American, old and new, that change is the 
essence of life, and that American society is a process, not a conclusion. 
The abundant resources of this land provided the foundation for a great 
nation. But only people could make the opportunity a reality. Immigration 
provided the human resources. 
—President John F. Kennedy, 1958318 
Governments across the globe leverage immigration to grow their economies, 
address demographic shortages, create new industries, and meet labor demands.319 Well-
managed immigration systems should support the migration of individuals to meet broad 
economic, social, and humanitarian interests. For the United States, immigration has 
generated economic growth by supplying much-needed labor, increasing the country’s 
productivity, and adding to its business dynamism.320 The United States has benefited 
from the immigration class’s contributions to entrepreneurship, business, academic and 
scientific advances, and culture.321 U.S. immigration policies should be continuously 
developed to support a spectrum of national interests.  
A. OVERALL FINDINGS 
Over the past six decades, the U.S. immigration system has prioritized family 
reunification. Such immigration policies are fundamental to the American tradition of 
valuing the sanctity of family.322 However, family-based immigration is often at the center 
of immigration reform debates. Since they are not screened for their skills and potential 
economic contributions to the United States, family-based immigrants are often perceived 
to be low-skilled and uneducated. Critics of family-based immigration argue that a system 
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that prioritizes family ties over skills does not serve the national interests of the United 
States, especially economic interests. Thus, the first research question herein sought to 
define national interests. Chapter II enumerated those interests, ultimately finding that they 
are continually evolving as a result of changing economic and political environments.  
More importantly, this thesis sought to answer a second research question: Does 
the current U.S. immigration policy support U.S. national interests? This thesis has 
determined that the current U.S. immigration policy does not best serve national interests. 
This is not because the policy prioritizes family-based immigration, however; it is due to 
stagnant immigration policy that does not respond to the changing needs of the country. 
The last time the United States examined its immigration system to support U.S. national 
interests was in 1990, with the enactment of the Immigration Act of that year. Since the 
1990 Act, the economy has continued to grow, industries have transformed, and the U.S. 
working population has changed.  
The current immigration apparatus is broken; it cannot wholly fulfill two of its 
objectives: reuniting families and bringing skilled workers to the country. Both family-
sponsored and employment-based immigrants face extensive backlogs. The 1990 Act 
aligned the nation’s priorities by establishing worldwide immigration limitations and per-
country caps, which restrict the number of visa allotments each country can receive 
annually.323 However, the amount of solicited immigrant visas far exceeds the number of 
available visas for both categories, which means millions of people are waiting to be either 
reunited with their family members or wishing to work permanently in the United States. 
The per-country caps have created wait times of over twenty years for some prospective 
immigrants.  
Numerous proposed amendments have circulated in recent years. Supporters for 
increased skilled migration have argued that limiting family-based immigration and 
shifting admission numbers to the employment-based categories would alleviate backlogs 
and bring more skilled workers to the United States.324 Others, like Republican 
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Congressman Kevin Yoder, supported the Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act of 
2017, which would alleviate backlogs in the employment-based categories by removing 
the per-country limit.325 Removing the per-country limit has been a popular 
recommendation, as many believe it would both decrease backlogs and increase the stream 
of highly skilled workers into the country.326  
The current discourse regarding immigration reform continues to surround the 
family-based and employment-based categories. Solutions for improving the existing 
system have focused less on remedying the mechanisms and more on shifting to a point-
based system, which selects immigrants based on their desirability. The perceived heavy 
emphasis on family-based immigration fuels the Trump administration’s arguments that 
the current system fails to meet the country’s economic needs and prevents the United 
States from attracting the best and brightest immigrants. The administration has supported 
policy reforms that call for “common-sense” changes that center on merit and skill.327 In 
May 2019, President Trump announced an immigration proposal that includes a point-
based merit system, increasing merit-based selections and limiting family-based 
immigration to immediate family members (spouses and children).328 As of this writing, a 
proposed bill has not reached Congress.  
Some policymakers and immigration restrictionists correlate the immigrant 
admissions problem with chain migration. The United States allows family-based 
immigrants to make up a significant share of annual admissions. However, assumptions 
surrounding chain migration are inaccurate. As this study demonstrated in Chapters III and 
IV, family ties do not guarantee admission. Critics have propagated a narrative of a 
dysfunctional system in which family-based immigrants are to blame, which ignores the 
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economic contributions that family-based immigrants make. Family-based immigrants are 
increasingly better educated, work in an array of professions (including high-skilled work), 
are adaptable to labor market changes, and provide a much-needed labor supply. Family-
based immigrants also have established networks that are essential for their upward 
mobility. 
The United States has yet to use a points-based system as a basis for immigrant 
admissions, but Canada has implemented such a system effectively. Chapter IV revealed 
that Canada’s immigration policies have merit. However, the value of Canada’s system is 
not in the number of skilled immigrants the country admits but rather in the system’s 
continual assessment and improvement. Canada’s immigration reforms have been more 
frequent and have proved to be more responsive to economic and demographic changes 
during the last thirty years. Furthermore, Canada’s points-based system is only successful 
if the desired result is to simply increase the number of citizens in the country who hold 
advanced degrees and can speak English. 
As this study has shown, the United States needs immigrants who fill more than 
one particular niche. Additionally, as is often overlooked by U.S. policymakers, Canada 
has also found merit in bringing in skilled immigrants with familial ties and has a separate 
family-based immigrant category. Thus, a well-managed immigration system is one that 
incorporates different pathways for legal immigration.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Presently, the Trump administration believes that a well-managed immigration 
system is one that focuses on growing the economy, protecting the U.S.-born worker, and 
enhancing America’s competitiveness. Undeniably, the existing immigration system 
requires modernization. The United States of today is vastly different from the United 
States of 1990. The challenge for the United States is finding the middle ground on an 
immigration system that could meet the needs of all stakeholders.329 
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It is important to recognize that there is still a significant demand for family 
immigration and that family-based immigrants play a vital role in the economy. 
Immigration policies that limit family-based immigration are not only counterintuitive to 
American ideals but may lead to unintended consequences.330 For example, millions of 
family members are awaiting admission to the United States. Eliminating or restricting 
family-based immigration could lead to an increase in undocumented migrants. A well-
managed immigration system is one that allows both family unity and the migration of 
skilled workers. Based on the research completed for this thesis, the following 
recommendations should be considered by the U.S. government. 
(1) Create a new visa category for waitlisted skilled immigrants.  
The United States has a system in place to bring in skilled workers, which is largely 
employer-driven. At the same rate, the wait times for family-based preference categories 
are lengthy, ranging from five to twenty-four years. Waitlisted family-based immigrants 
may possess a skill that the United States is in shortage of (i.e., nursing, skilled labor) but 
lack an employer that could sponsor them. The creation of a new visa category for family 
waitlisted skilled immigrants would allow for quicker family reunification while at the 
same time benefiting the U.S. labor market.  
(2) Review the system annually. 
Canada provides valuable lessons of flexible immigration policies that can be 
changed if they fail to meet national interests. Canada reviews its immigration projections 
in three-year increments, an administrative function completed by one of its government 
departments. The United States should consider granting administrative control over 
immigrant visa allocations to USCIS, the government agency that manages immigration 
benefit programs. An annual governmental review of the system’s shortcomings, and 
forecasts of long-term needs would allow for policy that is responsive to the nation’s short 
and long-term needs. 
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(3) Create “super visas” for short-term stays. 
The United States could implement a super visa, as Canada has done for some of 
its family-based immigrant categories. Allowing super visas for family members (such as 
parents) who may wish to come to the United States for short-term periods could decrease 
the number of visa requests in the family immigrant categories.  
(4) Adjust employment-based visas to reflect the labor market. 
The current employment visa category can be expanded or contracted to help 
facilitate the demands of the labor market. High- and low-skilled occupations, labor 
markets, and economies are not stagnant. As such, any proposed legislation should 
incorporate regulations that allow for administrative review of employment-based 
immigrant categories. Creating controls based on market data (e.g., projected labor 
shortages or surpluses) for both low- and high-skilled occupations may lead to better 
targeted allocations of available visas across the board.  
(5) Research the consequences of a highly educated and skilled immigrant 
population. 
Most economic studies focus on the effects that low-skilled immigrants have on 
U.S.-born workers, but shifting to an immigration system that prioritizes highly educated 
and skilled workers may lead to unintended consequences. Additional research and studies 
are warranted to predict the effects that a highly educated and skilled immigrant population 
may have on U.S.-born workers of similar qualifications.  
(6) Remove numerical limitations for skilled immigrants who are already 
employed in the United States. 
The majority of employment-based immigrants are already working in the United 
States on temporary work visas. The United States should consider removing numerical 
limitations for skilled immigrant workers who are already employed in the country. 
Allowing skilled immigrants to gain permanent residency more quickly would open up 
visa allocations for employers who wish to hire permanent foreign workers. This would 
81 
also eliminate the problem of skilled workers living in a state of limbo as they await 
decisions on their visa status.  
(7) Increase allocations for employment-based visas for certain skills. 
The United States currently allocates 40,000 employment-based visas for skilled 
workers (such as nurses, skilled-trade workers, and Information Technology 
professionals). Projected labor shortages in these fields call for an increase in the total visa 
allocations. 
(8) Review per-country caps.  
Countries with large numbers of highly skilled workers (e.g., China and India) are 
more likely to exceed the per-country cap than countries with smaller populations. Per-
country caps should therefore be increased or eliminated to permit the migration of skilled 
workers from high-demand countries. Eliminating the per-country caps will facilitate the 
migration of skilled workers, eliminate extensive backlogs, and promote economic 
growth.331 
(9) Create a separate visa category for family members of skilled workers. 
Due to family reunification policies, skilled workers can bring their families to the 
United States. Family members count against the 140,000 employment-based visa 
allocations given annually. Family members of skilled workers should be given a separate 
visa category. 
(10) Adjust the categories for employment-based visa allotments. 
Employment-based immigrant categories also include other subcategories that are 
not strictly for employment purposes (e.g., special immigrants). Other immigrant 
categories should not count toward the total employment-based visa allotments given 
annually.  
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(11) Create social services for better immigrant integration. 
Canada has comprehensive social services that provide new immigrants with the 
tools they need to integrate more efficiently into Canadian society. This includes language 
services, job placement, access to health care, and assistance with obtaining credentials.332 
The U.S. government should implement similar social policies to assist immigrants with 
integration.  
C. FINAL THOUGHTS  
A well-managed immigration system that can reform itself based on changing needs 
would best serve the United States’ national interests. Common-sense immigration reform 
requires us to do more than look toward foreign partners for solutions; we must also review 
the system that is currently in place and find ways to enhance existing policies. The 
research shows that immigration is about more than meeting economic needs. The United 
States of today is the result of millions of immigrants that have contributed to the country’s 
progress. Immigrants from a range of diverse backgrounds—with varying education, skills, 
and abilities—have all added to the country’s sense of community and social prosperity. 
Immigration reform in the twenty-first century should do more than address economic 
competitiveness; it should also strengthen the country’s role as a global leader, 
demonstrating to other countries that welcoming immigration policies are foundational to 
the success of democratic nations. 
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